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Abstract 
This thesis highlights the insights and shortcomings of personal retirement savings plans 
(PRSP) structure, operations and performance. These schemes were, at first, established in 
1989, with the purpose of encouraging personal savings and, at the same time, complementing 
the traditional system of pension provision. Because of their voluntary nature, the state offered a 
special fiscal regime to PRSP in order to promote individuals’ reliance on private pension 
savings. PRSP are administered by pension plan sponsors. Together with investment managers, 
they find that their privileged access to information and to sophisticated techniques of 
performance evaluation allows them to achieve superior performances (for a portfolio security) 
than the ones reached by a financially myopic individual. To investigate this point, an analysis 
was conducted on return, risk, security selection and market timing performance of a sample of 
20 representative personal retirement savings funds (PRSF), hold in the form of pension funds. 
This thesis begins with a brief debate on the impact of demographic evolution in the Portuguese 
pension system, with a special reference to the third pillar of pension protection. Then, it 
portrayed PRSP status quo and growth trends, and pointed out some criticisms and an 
alternative to these schemes. The final section examines PRSF performance. It starts with a brief 
description on the data, methodology and data limitations, followed by a literature review on 
portfolio performance measures and market timing. Using a time series regression on PRSF 
gross returns, some illustrative results are presented and identified the potential distortionary 
outcome of portfolio performance measures.  
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Resumo 
Esta tese procura salientar as virtudes e debilidades inerentes à estrutura, modus 
operandis e desempenho dos planos de poupança reforma (PPR). Estabelecidos, pela primeira 
vez, em 1989, estes planos propunham-se a estimular a poupança voluntária bem como a 
complementar os esquemas tradicionais de provisão de pensões. Por serem planos de subscrição 
voluntários, o estado concedeu-lhes um regime fiscal especial a fim de promover a confiança 
dos indivíduos neste tipo de poupança privada para a velhice. Os PPR são geridos por entidades 
gestoras de fundos de pensões que, juntamente com os gestores de investimento, consideram 
que o seu acesso privilegiado à informação e às técnicas sofisticadas de avaliação do 
desempenho das carteiras lhes permite obter um desempenho superior àquele que seria obtido 
por um individuo com miopia financeira. Para investigar este facto, foram analisados o 
rendimento, risco, selecção individual e market timing de uma amostra composta por 20 fundos 
de poupança reforma (FPR), detido sobre a forma de fundos de pensões. A tese começa com 
uma breve discussão sobre o impacto da evolução demográfica no sistema de pensões nacionais, 
com especial referência para o terceiro pilar de protecção social. Segue-se, uma descrição sobre 
o status quo  e as tendências de crescimento dos PPR. São também apontadas algumas críticas 
aos PPR bem como uma alternativa a estes esquemas complementares. Por fim, analisa-se a 
desempenho dos PPR, com uma breve descrição sobre os dados, metodologia adoptada e 
respectivas limitações. Segue-se uma revisão da literatura referente à avaliação do desempenho 
de carteiras e ao market timing. Tendo por base uma regressão temporal sobre o rendimento 
bruto dos FPR, são ilustrados os resultados alcançados e identificados os possíveis desfechos 
distorcionários que podem decorrer das medidas de avaliação do desempenho das carteiras. 
 
Palavras-chave: poupança pessoal, sistema tradicional de provisão das pensões, regime fiscal 
especial, evolução demográfica, avaliação do desempenho das carteiras 
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Pension plan: is an officially binding contract with an explicit retirement purpose, designed to 
provide individuals a pension income. Apart from having an explicit retirement objective, 
pension plans may offer additional benefits, such as pre-retirement income, disability, sickness, 
and survivors’ benefits.  
Savings plan: is an officially binding contract with an explicit precautionary saving objective, 
intended to grant individuals a supplementary income. In Portugal, this includes Personal 
retirement savings funds, Education savings funds and Personal retirement/ Education savings 
funds which may be settled under three forms: life insurance, pension fund and investment fund.  
Pension plans classification 
Public pension plan: is a public programme managed by a general government (that is central, 
state, and local governments, as well as other public sector bodies such as social security 
institutions).  
Private pension plan: is a private programme managed by an institution other than general 
government (that is a private entity acting as a plan sponsor, a private pension fund or a private 
sector provider). These pension plans may act as complement or substitute instrument for public 
pension plans.  
Private pension plans classification 
1. Occupational pension plan: is a plan where individual’s access is directly correlated to an 
employment or professional bond between the plan member and the entity setting up the plan 
(the plan sponsor). Such plan may be managed by the plan sponsor or by an independent entity 
(a pension fund or a financial institution operating as pension provider).   
● Mandatory occupational pension plan: employer’s participation in such plan is compulsory. 
That is, employers are legally complied to participate in a pension plan setting up and making 
contributions to occupational pension plans while employees may voluntarily join these plans. 
                                                 
1 From World Bank 1994, Averting the Old Age Crisis; OECD (2005), Private Pensions – OECD 
Classification and Glossary; PAIFPC On-line Glossary 
  
● Voluntary occupational pension plans: employer’s participation in such plan is voluntary 
(including contexts where there is automatic enrolment in the sequence of an employment 
contract or whenever there is a legal requirement to join plans set up on a voluntary basis by 
their employers). This plan is defined as voluntary, though employers are required to sponsor 
such plans so as to be (partially) exempted from social security contributions. 
2. Personal pension plan: is a plan where individual’s access is not correlated to an 
employment relationship. This plan is established and managed directly by a pension fund or a 
financial institution operating as a pension provider without any intervention of employers. 
Individuals may join these plans by purchasing and selecting few aspects of the private 
arrangements as well as employers may make contributions to personal pension plans. In some 
personal plans, membership may be limited. 
● Mandatory personal pension plan: individual’s participation or eligibility to receive pension 
benefits in such plans is compulsory. Individuals may be claimed to make contributions to a 
pension plan of their preference or to a particular pension plan. 
● Voluntary personal pension plan: individual’s participation in this plan is voluntary. It 
includes those plans that individuals must join if they wish to complement part of their social 
security benefits with the benefits received from personal pension plans. 
Figure I. Pension Plan structure:  
 
Source: OECD (2005), Private Pensions – OECD Classification and Glossary 
 
The guarantees may be offered by the pension plan itself or by the plan provider in the form of: 
Pension Plans 
Public Pension Plans Private Pension Plans 
       Occupational         Personal  
Mandatory Voluntary Mandatory Voluntary  
  
• Defined-benefit plan: a plan that stipulates a definite pre-amount of benefit upon 
retirement, regardless of the performance of the underlying investment pool, and wherein 
contributions are estimated in order to fulfil the benefits payment requirements. 
• Defined-contribution plan: a plan specifying a definite pre-amount of contributions, 
whereas the final amount of benefit received by the employee depends on the investment's 
performance and on the cumulative amount of such contributions. 
• Mix plan: a plan, simultaneously, ensuring a defined-benefit plan and a defined-
contribution plan. 
Defined-benefit plans may be classified, in the context of the social security system as:  
• Plan integrated with social security: a pension plan offering a retirement complementary 
income linked to the value of social security pension value.  
• Plan non-integrated with social security: a pension plan setting up the receiving benefits 
in accordance to a fraction of individual’s salary by the time of retirement or any other 
indicator, unlinked to the value of social security pension value. 
With reference to the type of financing, pension plans may be organized as:  
• Contributory plan: a pension plan offering the possibility of the existence of participants’ 
contributions in the accumulation of benefits.  
• Non-Contributory plan: a pension plan financed exclusively with the sponsor(s) 
contributions.  
Pension funds definition 
Pension fund: is a pool of assets forming an independent legal entity purchased with the 
contributions to a pension plan with an exclusive objective of financing pension plan benefits. 
Additionally, fund members hold a legal or beneficial right or any other contractual claim 
against the assets compiled in the pension fund.  
Pension funds classification: 
  
Closed pension funds: refers to only one sponsor or a number of sponsors directly related to 
each other. 
Open pension funds: allows for a collective or a singular affiliation without the need for any 
link between the sponsors. 
Open pension funds classification: 
Personal retirement savings funds: funds financing personal retirement savings plans. 
Education savings funds: funds financing education savings plans. 
Retirement/ Education savings funds: funds financing retirement/education savings plans. 
Equity savings funds: funds financing equity savings plans. 
Others: funds not financing any of the savings funds described earlier that allow for a collective 
affiliation. 
Investment funds definition 
Investment funds:  is a pool of assets forming an independent legal entity, resulting from the 
aggregation and application of the savings raised by an individual or collective investor, defined 
as participants, in primary and/or secondary security markets.  
Life insurance classification 
Life insurance: is a binding contract between the policy owner and the insurer, designed to 
provide a financial security income until the insurer’s death. Insurers agree to pay an amount of 
money, in certain and arbitrary moments, upon the occurrence of the insured individual's or 
individuals' death receiving, in exchange, a predetermined amount (premium) at regular 
intervals or in lump sums ("paid up" insurance) amounts.  
Annuity: is a stream of payments over a specified period of time (i.e. death) used as an 
instrument of securing a regular income amount for the beneficiary. 
Collective subscription vs. individual subscription  
Collective subscription: is a binding contract between an open pension fund management 
company and one or more sponsors willing to join the fund in order to finance a particular 
pension plan. 
  
Individual subscription: is a binding contract between an open pension fund management 
company and a contributor (individual or collective), in which the purchase of certificate units 
belongs to the participant responsible for the purchase.  
Agent’s classification and other definitions  
Sponsors: collective persons whose pension plans are financed through a pension fund. 
Beneficiaries: individuals who are entitled to the benefits obtained within the pension plan. 
Benefit: the cash flow prescribed by a specified pension plan. 
Participants: individuals whose eligibility to participate in a pension fund is determined in 
accordance to the biding contract, regardless of their role as an active (working or contributing, 
and hence actively accumulating assets), passive (retired, and hence receiving benefits) or 
deferred (holding deferred benefits) participant.     
Contributors: individuals contributing to a pension fund or an entity performing contributions 
carried out on behalf and in favour of participants. 
Contribution: deliver made to a pension fund by a sponsor, a contributor or a participant. Note 
that, the sponsor’s contribution to the pension fund may be carried out in cash, securities, etc., 
while participant’s contribution to the pension fund must be carried out in money.  
Withdrawal: trade or reimbursement of the certificate units of a fund. 
Certificate units: fractions representing the investment fund, in which the total inflow amount 
of certificate units constitute the total net value of the investment fund.  
Classification of the costs incurred on private pension provision  
Commission: monetary amount paid by the fund or by the fund participant in order to 
compensate the costs of fund managing. 
Depositary Commission: amount charged to the fund so as to compensate the fund managing 
activity of the depository bank. This commission is estimated as a fraction of the total net value 
of the fund.    
Withdrawal/ Reimbursement Commission: amount charged directly to the fund participant 
by the time of withdrawal and estimated as a fraction of the value corresponding to the 
  
withdrawal of certificate units, which may vary in accordance to the permanence period of the 
participant in such fund.  
Subscription/Emission Commission: amount charged directly to the fund participant by the 
time of subscribing a certificate unit and estimated as a fraction of the value corresponding to 
the subscription of certificate units. 
Pension systems types and other definitions 
Pay-as-you-go system: is a public method of financing whereby current outlays on pension 
benefits are paid out of current revenues from an earmarked tax, often a payroll tax. It assumes 
an intergenerational commitment whereby active workers secure an income to retirees, as long 
as the following generations entering in the labour market pay their future pension by the time 
they retire.   
Fully funded system: is a method of financing whereby individuals’ contributions, mandatory 
or voluntary, are accumulated in personal accounts that will provide them income security by 
the time of retirement.     
Replacement rate: the percentage of pre-retirement income that is available to a worker by the 
time he reaches retirement. 
    Demographic definitions  
Total old age ratio: the ratio between the number of individuals currently left out at the 
working age (and over 65 years old) and the number of individuals from the active population 
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1. Introduction 
The growing awareness of the need to continue modernising social protection systems is on 
State’s policy agenda in order to ensure a financially and socially sound future and to cope with 
the effects of demographic ageing. It has become evident that the social security system on its 
own cannot provide an adequate level of income to the old age. In this context, second and third 
pillars have emerged with the aim of complementing the traditional public pension system. The 
improvement of these two pillars may not only avert social security crises it may even develop 
capital markets, encouraging the investment in new financial products and stimulating long-run 
savings. However, the growth of these two pillars will depend, greatly, on the structural 
adjustments addressed to financial markets by State’s pursuing policies. 
The current study concerns the third pillar of the Portuguese pension system. The third 
pillar denotes the individual pension provision, contracted on a voluntary basis, next to public 
pensions and work-related pension schemes, and is designed to cover up pension gaps from first 
and second pillars. Individual’s contribution to the third pillar may occur through the purchase 
of an individual life insurance and/or a personal retirement savings plan (PRSP). Both schemes 
share a common aim of pursuing an additional income upon retirement. Yet, the objective of 
this thesis is to analyse the performance of personal retirement savings plans. In Portugal, few 
researchers have studied the performance of personal retirement savings (PRSF). This may be 
due to system’s short maturity. The present thesis aims to grant a greater understanding on the 
financial functions of these schemes. However, the purpose of this study is not to provide a 
complete survey on the performance of PRSF, but rather to highlight the insights and 
shortcomings of these schemes structure, operations and performance, in ensuring (individuals) 
an extra retirement income and, simultaneously, alleviating state’s burden on pension provision. 
Plan participant’s greater reliance on personal retirement savings funds has been 
encouraged by the potential welfare gains of investing in a tax-favoured scheme with low risk 
levels for a target rate of return. Pension plan sponsors and investment managers argue that their 
access to private and public information (not available to public) and also to sophisticated 
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techniques of performance evaluation allow them to achieve higher performances (for a 
portfolio security) than the ones reached by a financially myopic individual.  
To investigate this point, a simple test was performed by running a time series 
regression on the gross returns of 20 representative PRSF over the period 2003-2007. The goal 
was to identify the schemes that out performed both the market and the risk free rates due to 
investment manager’s financial literacy on asset allocation policy and security selection. 
Nonetheless, Sharpe, Alexander and Bailey (1995) found that a portfolio’s superior performance 
in the past does not guaranty superior returns in the future, as it may have been the result of 
good luck or even manager’s ability to capture market movements. Conversely, a portfolio’s 
poor performance may be the result of bad luck, excess of shifts in the asset classes, etc. In 
order to disentangle the effects of luck and manager’s financial proficiency, the study introduces 
the measures of portfolio’s performance of Treynor, Sharpe, Jensen and Fama, among others. 
The estimation results suggests that although not requiring substantial investment amounts, 
PRSF fail to generate a significant pension savings due to portfolio’s poor performance. Also, 
since participants are risk averse they may achieve superior investment performances through 
actively purchasing risk-free assets (such as cash, deposits and T-bonds) instead of a PRSF. 
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief debate on the impact of 
demographic issues in the Portuguese pension system and presents an overview on the 
institutional environment of the third pillar of pension protection across countries and within the 
empirical research. Section 3 describes personal retirement savings plans status quo and growth 
trends, and points out some criticisms and an alternative to PRSP. Section 4 begins with a brief 
description on the data (Section 4.1), methodology (Section 4.2) and methodology limitations 
regarding the assessment of PRSF performance (Section 4.3). The next two sections focus on 
the literature review on portfolio performance measures (Section 4.4) and market timing 
(Section 4.5). Section 4.6 presents some illustrative results and analysis on schemes 
performance. The study concludes by identifying potential distortionary outcome of portfolio 
performance measures (Section 4.7).   
 - 7 - 
2. Demographic trends: shifting longevity risk towards retirement savings arrangements 
2.1 Re-evaluating the scope of public pension provision 
Demographic ageing is, above all, the product of considerable economic, social and 
medical progress, allowing individuals the opportunity to live longer and healthier.  Such 
transformation brings up important challenges to pension systems. However, it varies widely 
between regions, in timing and magnitude, partly reflecting discrepancies in fertility, life 
expectancy and immigration trends. Figure 1 demonstrates the evolution of the Portuguese 
population pyramid and its progressive population ageing through the age cohorts.   
Figure 1: Population by age group and gender (in percentage of the resident population) 
 
Source: Demographic Statistic 2006, INE 
 
The base tends to narrow, reflecting a shrink in total’s population size as a result of lower 
fertility rates, while the increase share of older and very old individuals in the total population 
enlarges, as a consequence of an improvement in life expectancy trends. Hence, there are two 
main drivers of population ageing:  
1) Decline in fertility rates;  
2) Increase in longevity gains.  
Portugal’s declining fertility trends happen to converge with the overall scenario 
occurring in EU countries (Figure 2).  
Man Women 
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Figure 2: Total fertility rate2 (in percentage) 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2007), Portugal-20 Anos  Integração Europeia/Portugal, INE 
 
The explanations for the performance of total’s fertility rates balance between economist’s 
rational choice approach and sociologist’s cultural and individual changing values. The 2007 
European Commission report disentangled the motives behind both approaches. Under an 
economist perspective3, the movement in fertility rates may be described by three views: 
1. Becker’s findings4 which pointed women’s participation in the labour force has the 
responsible vehicle for the increase in the opportunity cost of having children; 
2. Easterlin’s researches5 which highlighted the effects of individuals expectations upon 
marriage and childbearing; that is, whenever individual’s welfare gains exceeded their 
expectations, they would tend to be optimistic and, consequently, feel free to marry and 
have children, while if the opposite situation occurs, this would leave them pessimistic 
and uncertain regarding marriage and childbearing; 
3. Friedman’s studies which concentrated on the economic value of childbearing; that is, 
individuals tend to have children in order to lessen the uncertainty6 in their lifetime.  
                                                 
2 The total fertility rate has to be seen as a projection since it is affected by a “tempo effect”; that is, it 
derives the future fertility trend of younger women from the probability of giving birth among current 
older cohorts of women, and thus the postponement of childbearing by older women is not taken into 
account, leading to a slowdown in the total fertility rate, though the probability of having children in later 
years is increased. 
3 This is regarded as the first demographic transition scenario (FDT). 
4 See more in Becker, G.S. (1981), A Treatise on the Family, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA. 
5 See more in Easterlin, R.A. (1980), Birth and Fortune: The impact of numbers on personal welfare, 
Basic Books, New York. 
6 In most developed countries, this uncertainty has been overcome with the implementation of social 
protection systems. 
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Conversely, sociologists’ findings claim that fertility changes are driven by other factors rather 
than economic aspects. To investigate this point, Van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe (1987)7 focused 
on individual’s changing values and behaviour since 1960s.  
A part from shifts in fertility trends, population ageing has been the result of an 
improvement in mortality rates in early life. This fact derives from socio-economic and health 
progresses. Recently, there has been also a significant decline in the mortality rates of 
population in their midterm life. This fact is contingent on lifestyle changes and on the 
appearance of medical treatment to deadly diseases (Figure 3). 
 Figure 3: Life-expectancy at birth 
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2007), Portugal-20 Anos Integração Europeia/Portugal, INE 
 
The combination of these two drivers of demographic ageing (fertility rates and life-
expectancy) results in three interactive trends8: 1) ageing in the working age population; 2) 
ageing among the elderly population and 3) ageing in the overall population. 
With respect to “ageing in the working age population”, it is important to observe the 




                                                 
7 Van de Kaa, D. J. (1987), Europe's second demographic transition, Population Bulletin, No 42, pp.1-57. 
8 For further information see: Ribeiro, J.F.(2003), Sistemas de pensões na Europa – Exemplos de 
“Pequenas economias abertas”, Departamento de Prospectiva e Planeamento, Ministério das Finanças  
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Figure 4: Changes in the Portuguese population structure, 2005-2050 (in thousands) 
 
Source: Demographic Statistic 2006, INE 
Note 1: The three colours are divided according to the demographic structure of the population. 
Therefore, colour grey corresponds to individuals under 14, colour purple corresponds to individuals in 
the working age population (15-64 years old) and colour blue corresponds to individuals over 65. 
Note 2: The 2005 and 2006 values are estimates. From 2007 until 2050, the values correspond to 
projections.  
 
Individuals in the working age population (15-64) will be most numerous until 2010 and 
will gradually decline to, approximately, 55% by 2050 (comparing to 67,3% registered in 2006). 
This will induce an upward trend in the total old-age dependency ratio (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Total old-age dependency ratios  
 
Source: Instituto Nacional de Estatística (2007), Portugal-20 Anos Integração Europeia/Portugal, INE 
 
The total old age ratio matches with the evolution of Portuguese population pyramid and, at the 
same time, it converges and even surpasses, by the year of 2000, the EU15 estimates. According 
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to the Instituto Nacional de Estatística, this indicator seems to have benefit from a «youth 
potential which happen to have smoothed the “ageing effect” in the overall population». 
However, this smooth in the ageing process will depend on governments’ ability to 
pursue policies that enhance, simultaneously, the participation of older workers in the labour 
force (raising the effective retirement age), the level of education of the labour force (increasing 
productivity) and households precautionary savings for retirement  (rising the investment on 
private pension arrangements).   
As for “ageing among the elderly population”, it is expected to continue increasing. One 
major question is whether this upward trend is associated to healthy life years. According to 
table 1, Portugal’s estimates are below EU15. Thus, there is a clear gap between the trends in 
longevity (figure 3) and the years in healthy ageing. Meaning that, the participation of older 
workers in the labour force is compromised by their capability to remain in good health. 
Table 1: Healthy ageing in 2003 (in life years) 
 
Source: European Commission (2007), Europe's demographic future: Facts and figures on challenges 
and opportunities, October, EC.  
Note 1: E- estimation results; P- Provisional results. 
 
Also, given that the elderly population is a major consumer on health and long-term care, the 
low levels of healthy life years registered above will pressure public healthcare spending and, 
consequently, increase the demand for these types of services (table 2). 
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Table 2: Trends on healthcare spending (in percentage of GDP)  
 
Source: European Commission (2007), Europe's demographic future: Facts and figures on challenges 
and opportunities, October, EC.  
 
Besides health and long-term care costs, “ageing in the overall population” is likely to 
increase public spending on pensions. Hence, government’s high expenditure on old age 
security systems may crowd out the investment in other important sectors. In the limit, this fact 
may hinder the sustainability of public finances. Table 4 depicts the trend on public pension 
expenditures across the European countries. 
Table 3: Projections on public pension expenditure (in percentage of GDP) 
 
Source: European Commission (2007), Europe's demographic future: Facts and figures on challenges 
and opportunities, October, EC.  
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The results show that public spending on pensions will soar over the next decades, 
presenting significant differences among the European member states. This reflects an 
increasing shift to private pension arrangements and also a growing consciousness on the need 
to minimize poverty risks among the elderly population. As for Portugal, public pension 
expenditure is projected to increase significantly, highlighting the continuous concentration on 
statutory schemes for pension provision. As a result, public pension system is starting to be 
effectively or partially accounted as a deficit. The reasons are well known and are beyond 
demographic evolution. Among them, the following are described:  
1. system’s maturity, which replaces the stock of retirees to be renovated by new 
pensioners with higher income pensions;  
2. decrease in the economic growth, whereas governments may fail to meet their 
responsibilities (including pension provision);    
3. political cycles, that is pension systems may suffer from political pressure for 
portraying features that benefit from voters sympathy, in the short-run, but turn out to be 
inadequate and with lagging results, in the long-run. 
To meet these challenges, governments have intervened in the old age security systems pursuing 
policies that alleviate the intergenerational conflict between the old age (who are receiving a 
statutory pension) and the young cohorts (who are financing these benefits and have no 
guarantee that their lifetime transfers will grant them an adequate income by the time they reach 
retirement). 
 
2.2 Transition to a multi-pillar system 
In 1994 the World Bank developed a report entitled “Averting the Old Age Crisis”. This 
report provided facts and figures and called for new reforms. Furthermore, it analysed the 
problem of the old age income insecurity has a universal challenge that must be carried out 
through the perspective of those enrolled in retirement savings programmes.  
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The authors advocated that pension systems should be able to 1) provide income security to 
the elderly population and 2) help rather than hinder economic growth. To respond to their first 
objective, pension systems were recommended to retain the following three functions: 
• a saving function – persuading individuals to allocate part of their lifetime labour 
income towards retirement;  
• a redistribution function – guaranteeing a minimum pension income to those with 
lower earnings (and thus less apt to save);   
• an insurance function – securing the old age against several risks such as disability, 
longevity, inflation (which may erode their lifetime earnings), investment risk, etc.   
To reach the second objective, pension systems should try to: 
• minimize the cost that may affect economic growth (i.e.: disincentives in providing 
new jobs and active ageing; individuals’ unwilling attitude to save over their 
lifetime; administrative costs associated to pension provisions; inefficient allocation 
of capital and labour; high contribution rates which may lead to fiscal evasion); 
• be sustainable in the long-run (encouraging individuals to plan for retirement and 
thus securing pension systems against unforeseen contingencies resulting from 
demographic and economic trends); 
• be transparent (providing complete information to individuals and central 
governments by the time they perform a saving decision and, thus, protecting them 
against political distortions that may hinder the economic results, and, in micro 
terms, individuals earnings).  
World’s Bank report prescribed that the saving function should be separated from the 
redistributive function and thus should be placed “under different financing and managerial 
arrangements in two different mandatory pillars – one publicly managed and tax-financed, the 
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other privately managed and fully funded – supplemented by a voluntary pillar for those who 
want more.”9 
The public pillar is an anti-poverty structure financed and managed by the Sate on a pay-as-
you-go basis. It offers each covered employee an income pension unrelated with his earnings 
and contributions and mostly financed through social quotizations or payroll taxes. It has a 
redistributive function of reallocating individual’s income across and within generations, 
therefore protecting the elderly population against absolute poverty (consumption lower than the 
minimum subsistence level). 
The second pillar is a mandatory structure managed by the private sector on a fully funded 
basis. It may include two types of private arrangements: occupational plans and personal 
savings plans. The second pillar provides employees with a pension income that is strongly 
linked with their earnings and contribution levels, assuring greater benefits to those who 
contribute most. It differs from first pillar simply because it excludes employees with lower 
earnings (i.e. domestic servants, employees from the informal sector10, etc.) making pension 
coverage constrained to individuals contributions. The second pillar carries out the saving 
function of smoothing individual’s income through their life-cycle.  
The third pillar is a voluntary structure offering individuals a complement to their statutory 
pension income or even to their private pension plans (first and second pillars, respectively). It 
has a broad objective of, together with the second pillar, protect the old age against relative 
poverty (a decrease in consumption during retirement). Notwithstanding the separation of the 
redistribution and saving functions, the insurance function is established under the three pillars 
model, in an attempt to co-insure the old age against massive risks.  
Strong arguments have opposed the three pillar model as the first pillar is mostly exposed to 
the demographic evolution and to the financial burden this evolution entails, while second and 
third pillars, which place their investment funds in the capital market, are frequently vulnerable 
                                                 
9 World  Bank (1994), Averting the Old age Crisis , p.15  
10 Note that in developing countries, omitting employees of the non-formal sector is a great concern since 
a part of their GDP is financed through this sector.  
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to economic cycles. Consequently, instead of a model with three pillars, the World Bank 
developed (in 2005) a five pillar model defined as following: 
• zero pillar that offers the old age a flat or basic pension benefit that allows them to 
be above the absolute poverty line; 
• first mandatory pillar financed on a pay-as-you-go basis;  
• second pillar that is mandatory and privately managed; 
• third pillar which comprises occupational and personal saving plans;  
• fourth and fifth pillar addressed to the elderly population in need of a 
supplementary social assistance granted through informal channels that is, channels 
that  are not derived from public pensions, house ownership, intra-familial transfers 
or personal savings (i.e.: access to health care services, property, etc).  
The pension system in Portugal is a classical Bismarckian regime centred on the first 
pillar of pension provision. The first pillar covers almost the entire population, offering 
individuals different pension provisions: a general scheme addressed to private-sector workers 
and independent workers, and a special scheme for civil servants, police, and military forces. It 
also provides a minimum pension income to retirees.  
The Portuguese government has proposed (MTSS, 2006), and later introduced, a 
sequence of measures11 in order to offset some of the drag on long-term stability of pension 
provision (due to ageing and economic stagnation). For instance,  
                                                 
11These measures have prevented the social security trust fund (whose goal is the financial stabilization of 
the pay as you go regime) to be inaccessible by the year of 2015. However, according to a recent report of 
the Portuguese Association of Investment Funds, Pensions and Capital, no sizeable effects of future 
improvements in social security accounts can be expected under these corrective measures. In fact, future 
improvements in the long-term stability of the social security system will depend on state’s ability to 
implement a three pillar model over the current pension system architecture. Notably, a first pillar 
(entirely supported by the state) providing an earnings-related scheme, financed on a PAYG basis, and 
addressed to individuals earning twice the minimum salary. A second pillar, where participation is 
compulsory for individuals earning between two to ten times the minimum salary and where 50 % of 
individuals’ contributions is delivered to the state and the other half is managed by a private institution. 
This pillar would also include a programme of state’s “national accounts” set up on behalf of individuals 
and aimed to encourage personal savings. Last, a third pillar covering individuals with earnings higher 
than 10 times the minimum salary. Participation in this pillar would continue to be voluntary and 
encouraged through tax relief. 
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1) a new rule to the benefit formula, with the introduction of a demographic adjustment 
factor12 (as in the Swedish case), allowing pension benefits to be calculated according to 
life expectancy trends and thus repairing the equilibrium between the contribution years 
(which have declined) and  benefit years (which continue to increase);  
2) a new rule to the contribution formula based on the entire career’s earnings history 
and not on the best 10 years. Thus, the calculation on pension income is based on an 
average amount causing lower pension benefits; 
3) a new rule to the contribution formula, where the earnings-related pension is indexed 
to prices, adjusting to economic growth13; 
4) a greater participation of older workers in the labour force, encouraging the elderly 
population to postpone retirement14.  
The second pillar of the Portuguese pension system is a private and voluntary system 
financed on a funding basis which offers occupational schemes to individuals (mostly pension 
funds managed by insurance companies and/or pension funds management entities).  
The third pillar is a private and voluntary system which provides personal schemes that may 
take the form of: a life insurance scheme or a pension fund. It covers, among other savings 
products, personal retirement savings plans financed on a funding basis and exclusively 
designed to close pension gaps in first and second pillars.  
Second and third pillars are not very well developed in Portugal. Together, they act as a 
complementary structure to the first pillar of pension provision. These two pillars provide 
different types of schemes: 
1) a legal regime, planned to cover special needs or, simply, the contribution to a 
complementary regime in articulation with the public system;  
                                                 
12 This factor may be neutralised if individuals start to contribute more to the system or if they continue to 
participate in the labour market (active retirement). 
13 By doing this, government is eradicating the effect of political cycles on the present value of pensions 
and, at the same time, increasing the earnings of the poorest among retirees. 
14 Thus, raising the effective retirement age and increasing the average earnings history for new 
pensioners (today estimated as 27 years). 
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2) a contractual regime, planned to induce supplementary contributions to the 
providential subsystem in the part not covered by it;  
3) a voluntary regime, designed to secure an additional income to the individuals 
enrolled in such schemes (this is the case of personal retirement saving plans (PRSP)).    
Personal retirement savings plans were, firstly, established in 1989, with the objective 
of stimulating personal savings and, at the same time, complementing the public pension 
provision. Because of their voluntary nature, the state offered a special fiscal regime to these 
schemes in order to promote individuals’ greater reliance on private pension arrangements 
administered by pension plan sponsors.  Participation in such savings schemes is voluntary and 
encouraged through fiscal incentives. Individuals participating in these schemes are free to 
choose how much to contribute, so long they respect the ceiling limits. Chapter 3 describes, in 
detail, the legal and regulatory framework of such plans and their tax treatment. 
 
2.3 Overview on the third pillar of the pension provision 
2.3.1 Literature Review   
Much of the economic theory upon household’s savings and consumption decisions follows 
the life-cycle models. In its simple version15, the model predicts that individuals will tend to 
save16 greatly during their working lives in order to consume the saved assets by the time they 
reach retirement. One form of financing retirement is through the investment in savings plans 
during their lifetime.  
Gouveia (1997) advocated that the favourable tax treatment of PRSP creates a trade-off 
between the relative price over present and future consumption, so that the relative price of 
consuming today is greater than the price of consuming tomorrow. Hence, individuals will tend 
to substitute their present consumption for precautionary savings (substitution effect). This will 
                                                 
15 Major improvements were applied to the original model such as the introduction of:  a bequest motive, 
capital market imperfections (i.e., liquidity constraints), a specific alteration to the individual utility 
function over time or the inclusion of a form of expectation as to future income. 
16 Thus, the lifetime savings profile is expected to depend mostly on the rate of return to savings upon 
individual’s preferences over inter-temporal consumption. 
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force them to consume too little during their working period, leading to an increase in the net 
return to savings. However, fiscal incentives will likely increase the present value of future 
earnings on PRSP and, consequently, individuals’ natural reply to an increase in income would 
be a correspondent increase in consumption, therefore reducing savings (income effect). The 
two undertaken effects are not expected to offset each other, giving rise to an ambiguous overall 
effect.  
For Gouveia, PRSP fiscal relief is not likely to treat all the assets in the same way, 
favouring some assets in determent of others. As a result, such savings schemes fail to meet the 
desirable fiscal neutrality requirement and in addition, may influence individuals’ preferences 
with respect to consumption and savings. One can expect that, in times of fiscal generosity, 
individuals tend to participate more in personal retirement savings plans. However, greater 
fiscal incentives do not necessarily guarantee increases in private savings.  
In recent years, a wide range of empirical findings have tried to test the ability of 
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) plans – American tax-favoured retirement 
savings plans (TFRSP) similar to PRSP – in generating significant saving decisions (Poterba, 
Venti and Wise, 1995, 1996a, b) or modest saving outcomes (Engen, Gale and Scholtz, 1994, 
1996).  
Venti and Wise (1990, 1991) studied the welfare gains of those investing in IRAs and 
compared with the wealth of non-IRA contributors. They concluded that most contributions to 
IRA will likely increase private savings and this will result in little substitution effects (provided 
that their initial wealth is controlled).  
Gale and Scholtz (1994) followed the predecessor study and compared the savings of 
IRA limit contributors (those contributing the maximum limit amount to their IRA) to interior 
contributors (those contributing less than the maximum). Their results17 revealed that rises in the 
IRA limit contribution generate negligible savings amounts.  
                                                 
17 Gale-Scholz conclusions are based in the homogeneity assumption. This may lead to incorrect 
deductions that IRA form of savings displaces other savings alternatives. Thus, their results may be 
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Attanasio and DeLeire (2002) compared a sample of households that had just subscribed 
an IRA with the households who were already enrolled in these schemes. Their results 
suggested that individuals enrolled in IRA tend to finance this savings scheme not through a 
reduction in consumption but rather from existing savings or planned savings.  
Poterba, Venti and Wise18 (1995, 1996a and 1996b) provided a comparison between the 
welfare gains of those eligible for 401(k) plans with the wealth of ineligible households and 
concluded that contributions to 401 (k) schemes are likely to encourage new savings and less 
likely to be substituted by other forms of savings plans.  
Engen, Gale and Scholz (1994, 1996) considered the impact of 401(k) eligibility on 
broader measures of wealth (including home equity) and concluded that a 40l (k) raise in 
contributions may be financed using home equity, maintaining the total wealth unaffected. 
Antolin et al. (2005) suggested that the studies of Engen, Gale and Scholtz, and of Poterba, 
Venti and Wise, regarding the financial wealth of eligible and non-eligible households, may 
suffer from a number of caveats such as: 1) “the stock market boom of the 1980s, or 2) 
proportionate shifts in the allocation of wealth from real assets to financial assets, or 3) equal 
percentage declines in housing wealth among eligible and ineligible groups during the period 
could have caused changes in financial wealth and/or total wealth that ended up being confused 
with the impact of 401(k)”19. 
                                                                                                                                               
sensitive to changes in the specification and in the criteria used in the sample (Poterba, Venti and Wise, 
1996a,b). 
18 The authors tried to solve the heterogeneity problem of savers preferences using two particular 
approaches. Firstly, Poterba, Venti and Wise tested whether 401(k) eligibility is exogenous to preferences 
for savings (after controlling for earnings). They found evidences of a significant correlation between 
households eligibility to 401 (k) and the median financial wealth. However, some researchers find it hard 
to believe in the assumption that 401 (k) eligibility is exogenous to the underlying propensity to save 
(Engen, Gale, and Scholz, 1994), stating that employees with savings predisposition will tend to move 
towards jobs that grant a better pension coverage and, at the same time, employers will provide saving 
programmes such as 401 (k) as a response to employees motivations. Secondly, Poterba, Venti and Wise 
dismissed the assumption that eligibility is exogenous and compared eligible households, over a period of 
time, using a series of cross-sections (1984, 1987, and 1991) obtained from the Survey of Income and 
Programme Participation (SIPP). The results showed a growing move in the financial assets of the 
households eligible to 401 (k) programmes and thus, contributions to 401 (k) reflect new savings, rather 
than asset reshuffling. 
19 Antolin et al. (2005), Long-term budgetary implications of tax-favoured retirement saving plans, 
OECD Economic Studies No.39, 2004/2, p.40. 
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Recent studies have focused on the importance of favourable tax treatment in 401 (k) 
and other saving programmes over time and within earning groups. Engen and Gale (2000) 
found that a positive tax shelter is more likely to increase wealth among low earners or low 
savers than otherwise.  
Benjamin (2003) results indicate that some earning groups that frequently save the most 
(homeowners, IRA participants, educated individuals) react least to 401 (k) plans. Conversely, 
the share of contributions that represent new savings among renters and non-IRA holders is 
significant. On balance, the response to whether saving incentives such as Individual Retirement 
Accounts (IRAs) and 401(k) stimulate new savings, rather than divert existing assets, varies 
widely according to the assumptions20 (Table 4). 
Table 4: Summary on the empirical review of retirement savings schemes  
 
Source: Antolin et al. (2005). 
 
Behavioural economists propose a different perspective to study the welfare gains of 
purchasing a saving scheme. According to them, the effectiveness of tax-favoured retirement 
savings plans is constrained to individual’s bounded rationality, bounded willpower and 
                                                 
20 See Hubbard and Skinner (1996). 
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bounded self-interest21. Bernheim (1994) focused on the divergence between predicted and 
actual consumption and saving behaviours, indicating that individuals reach retirement with 
little financial knowledge. Moreover, he advocates that, on average, saving rates are only 1/3 of 
what is desirable. This places individuals with too little to consume during retirement.  
Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) advocated that those who are, financially, more 
sophisticated are the ones more likely to plan for the future. Conversely, individuals with fairly 
or no rudimentary financial planning may be the ones who face more difficulties in planning for 
retirement and are the least likely to participate in voluntary saving schemes such as PRSP. 
Laibson (1994) and Posner (1995) suggested that retirement savings plans may encourage 
individuals to save, while offsetting a “time inconsistency” or a “personal failing” in planning 
for retirement.  
2.3.2 The European and International Background   
Latin American countries were the first nations to forge a transition from a statutory 
PAYG pension system (of defined benefit pension plans) towards a funding regime based, in 
most cases, in defined contribution personal accounts.  
In 1981, Chile made a pioneer attempt to create a system of mandatory fully-funded and 
privately managed22 individual retirement accounts which happen to have inspired many other 
countries across the world. However, the past decades have been characterized by a general 
discontent regarding the funding of the pension system, particularly with respect to the 
restrictions23 on pension coverage, fees, portfolio allocation and returns. To overcome these 
                                                 
21 According to Mullainathan and Thaler (2000), bounded rationality “reflects the limited cognitive 
abilities that constrain human problem solving”; bounded willpower “captures the fact that people 
sometimes make choices that are not in their long-run interest” and, finally, bounded self-interest 
“incorporates the comforting fact that humans are often willing to sacrifice their own interests to help 
others”.   
22 The Chilean government moved from the PAYG regime, administered by the National Pensions 
Institute (IPN), to the so called Administered Pension Funds (APF), companies specialized in the 
management of pension funds. For further information see: Rodríguez, L. Jacobo (1999), Chile's Private 
Pension System at 18: Its Current State and Future Challenges, Cato Institute Social Security Paper, No. 
17, July 30. 
23 Firstly, pension coverage is constraint to individual’s ability to contribute beyond the obligatory 
minimum payment (10 percent of wages); thereby, there are individuals that are least likely to be enrolled 
in these schemes since their earnings are relatively low or derive from unstable employment or even 
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shortcomings, Chile’s government has addressed a sequence of reforms designed to relax some 
of pension funds regulations as the system matures and, at the same time, it has created a nest-
egg for the old age with low savings accounts (as long as they have 20 years of contributive 
career)24.    
Chilean’s ongoing experience has provided other countries important lessons on the need to 
retain the multi-pillar system, where the pillars act with each other in a complementary basis 
and not in a substitute order. In effect, it is possible to recognize two major models across the 
European countries (Ribeiro, 2003): 
• a privately funded pension system held in three or four pillars, with a special 
emphasis on the private capitalization pillars – as in the case of Switzerland, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Ireland, Finland, and the United Kingdom. 
• a state-funded pension system exclusively focused on the social security PAYG 
regime – as in the case of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal.  
It follows now a description of the multi-pillar model across six representative European 
countries – Switzerland, Netherlands and the United Kingdom (where the pension system model 
combines a capitalization pillar) and Germany, France and Spain (where the traditional PAYG 




                                                                                                                                               
because they work outside the formal labour market. Secondly, pension funds are remarkably costly and 
retain a significant share of their return (1/4 or 1/3 of employees’ contributions) in the payment of 
operating commissions to private management entities. Thirdly, pension funds managers invest a 
significant share of their portfolio in government bonds. And finally, fund's return must not exceed 2 p.p. 
below the industry's average real return in the last 12 months, limiting the possibility of obtaining better 
financial performances in the market. For further information see: Rodríguez, L. Jacobo (1999), Chile's 
Private Pension System at 18: Its Current State and Future Challenges, Cato Institute Social Security 
Paper, No. 17, July 30. 
24 De Mesa, A.A. et al (2006), The Chilean Pension Reform Turns 25: Lessons from the Social Protection 
Survey, Pension Research Council Working Paper, PRC WP 2006-9 
25 Note that, EU is not directly responsible for the pension funds regulatory framework. However, since it 
is of EU’s interest the promotion of social protection and cohesion, there is an implicit concern in giving 
member states an orientation regarding pension funds market. This fact limits pension funds portability 
between the European countries. 
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2.3.2.1 The Swiss case 
The multi-pillar model  
The Swiss old-age pension system is a multi-pillar system that includes three 
fundamental pillars: 
• First pillar – a public system financed on a PAYG regime and responsible for the 
provision of basic pensions and supplementary benefits. It is denominated AVS26 
and has the objective of guarantying a minimum income to retirees. 
• Second Pillar – a privately managed system financed on a funding basis and 
responsible for the provision of occupational schemes. It is designated by PP27 and 
participation is compulsory for dependent-employees whose annual income is 
higher than the minimum level.  
• Third Pillar – participation in this supplementary scheme is voluntary and 
encouraged through fiscal incentives.  
Overview on the third pillar  
The third pillar is based on personal retirement accounts that through voluntary 
contributions ensure a supplementary income made up to close pension gaps. These accounts 
comprise two versions: 
• Pillar 3a covers the personal accounts that are linked to retirement savings. These 
schemes are encouraged by tax incentives. Participation is open to individuals 
already covered by the second pillar of pension system, who may deduct from their 
taxable income up to 8% of the upper limit imposed to “coordinated earnings” used 
by the second pillar. ´ 
• Pillar 3b covers the pension accounts that can be used freely. In principal, these 
schemes do not benefit from tax advantages. Participation is constrained to 
individuals not covered by second pillar, who may deduct from their earnings up to 
                                                 
26AVS – Assurance vieillesse et survivants  
27PP – Prévoyance professionnelle vieillesse, survivants et invalidité 
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20% of those submitted to the first pillar system. Under this version, the savings 
amount that is exempt from taxation seems to be higher than the sum of the 
cumulative amounts obtained within the 2nd pillar and pillar 3a. 
The benefit receipt becomes due under retirement circumstances and whenever 
individuals continue to be actively employed until five years thereafter. The assets from the 
third pillar retirement accounts may be received in the form of an annuity or a lump-sum 
payment and may be inherited by the surviving spouse and children and any other relatives or 
beneficiaries nominated by the participant. Under normal conditions, the benefits may only be 
accessed or withdrawn, at the earliest, 5 years before the normal retirement age28, except in the 
cases of early withdrawal29.  
2.3.2.2 The Dutch case  
The multi-pillar model  
The Dutch pension system is a multi-pillar system that includes three basic pillars: 
• First pillar – provides a retirement income to individuals older than 65, whose full 
pension entitlement is reached under two conditions: 1) total payment of the 
quotizations over their earnings and 2) after 50 years of living in the Netherlands. 
• Second pillar – is financed on a funding basis and provides occupational benefit plans 
(roughly 88% of pension funds are defined benefit plans). This pillar covers work-
related supplementary pensions whereas participation is almost considered compulsory 
(recent estimations found that 91% of employees are enrolled in the second pillar of the 
Dutch pension system). 
• Third pillar – is represented by individual pension provisions operating under a 
capitalization regime and benefiting from tax shelter.  
 
 
                                                 
28 The official retirement age is 65 for men and 64 for women. 
29 That is: 1) repayment of a mortgage loan; 2) purchase of own-business; 3) transition to a different 
sector while self-employed; 4) emigration; 5) purchase of pension funds benefits; 6) disability; 7)death. 
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Overview on the third pillar  
The third pillar of the Dutch pension system covers personal pension plans. 
Participation in these plans is voluntary. Schemes returns are managed exclusively by insurance 
providers and may be claimed in the form of: 1) an annuity, which entitles participants to a 
fixed and periodic income benefit, 2) a unit-linked product30 where the funds returns are based 
on the performance of the underlying assets, or 3) a lump-sum payment. Pension plans are 
financed through individuals’ contributions, which are entitled to a tax relief in order to close 
the pension gaps of 2nd and 3rd pillars.  
2.3.2.3 The British  case  
The multi-pillar model  
The British old-age pension system is a multi-pillar system that includes three 
fundamental pillars: 
• First pillar: provides a basic state retirement pension (approximately £3,150 per 
year) to individuals filled in the National Insurance Contribution (NIC) list. 
Individual’s eligibility occurs by the time they reach 60 (for women) and 65 (for 
men).  
• Second Pillar: consists of a supplementary pension system that is made mandatory 
to employees with earnings that exceed the lower earnings limit (LEL), except for 
the independent workers. Individuals may choose to receive their benefit plans in 
the form of: 1) a public State Second Pension scheme (S2P); 2) a Stakeholder 
Pension scheme; 3) occupational pension schemes; 4) personal pension scheme. 
• Third Pillar: is a private pillar that allows individuals to purchase a fair pension 
fund or annuity upon retirement. 
 
 
                                                 
30 A unit-linked is a medium/long run saving product, which takes the form of a life insurance and whose 
portfolio is invested in mutual funds that enjoy liquidity and fiscal advantages.  
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Overview on the third pillar  
 The third pillar of the British pension system allows individuals to self-select a personal 
pension plan (PPP) that exists since 1988. These schemes represent long-term savings and are 
addressed to individuals31 claiming a greater retirement income than the public pension 
programme. Contributions are paid to pension plans sponsors (usually ran by building societies, 
banks, insurance companies and unit trusts) in the form of: a regular payment (frequently every 
month) or a lump-sum payment. Contributions to personal pension plans benefit from a fiscal 
advantage32 (a 20% tax deduction) that is in accordance with the Inland Revenue Pension 
Schemes Office. The capital gains of investing in a personal pension plan are exempted from 
taxation. Moreover, by the time individuals prepare to receive the accumulated earnings they are 
able to withdraw a quarter of the schemes earnings value as a tax-free lump-sum amount. The 
reminiscent may be applied in two ways: 1) by purchasing an annuity from a life insurance 
company, or 2) by allowing it to continue to be invested as a non-guaranteed pension income up 
to age 75 or, alternatively, as a guaranteed pension income by the time individuals reach 75.  
2.3.2.4 The German case  
The multi-pillar model  
The German pension system comprises a three-pillar model that retains: 
• First pillar – is an earnings-related scheme financed mostly through employees and 
employers contributions, partially by taxes (as no more than 37% of pension 
provision is paid by country’s national budget subsidies). The State does not 
provide a minimum pension, but it accounts for a means-tested social assistance. 
                                                 
31 Notably, personal pension plans are saving schemes that are mostly appropriate to: 1) independent 
workers; 2) individuals currently not working but that can bear PPP costs; 3) dependent workers whose 
employers do not provide a supplementary scheme, and 4) dependent workers that do not pay for the 
company pension scheme.   
32 Up to age 75, individuals benefit from a tax relief on contributions of up to 100 per cent of the capital 
earnings generated each year, subject to a maximum limit of £235,000 for the 2008-2009 tax year. 
Savings that overcome this limit are subject to a tax constraint so that: 1) if total pensions savings exceed 
the maximum limit and individuals take the excess as a lump-sum amount than this excess is taxed at 
55%; 2) if total pensions savings exceed the maximum limit and individuals take the excess as income 
amount than this excess is taxed at 25%. For further information see: http://www.direct.gov.uk/ 
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• Second pillar – consists on a supplementary and voluntary funded pension scheme 
encouraged through a favourable tax treatment. This pillar presents two different 
organizational structures: 1) for employees from the public sector, the second pillar 
is mainly represented by supplementary pension schemes operating within the firm 
and financed by employers; 2) for employees from the private sector, these are 
occupational and voluntary savings schemes.  
• Third pillar – is a voluntary pension pillar managed by insurance companies, 
investment funds or banks that grants participants an advantageous tax relief. 
Overview on the third pillar  
The second and third pillars of the German pension system were supported by the 2001 
Riester Reform33 which introduced a scheme of non-mandatory occupational pensions or, 
alternatively, of individual accounts. In either case, the law sets limits on the extent of pension 
provision schemes that can be subsidised.  There are two ways of providing a tax relief: 1) a 
subsidy to personal pensions on a voluntary basis; or 2) a subsidy via tax deductibility. 
Furthermore, eligibility to these schemes is constrained to: 
• Individuals ability to perform regular voluntary contributions; 
• Benefits start to be received at the age of 60 (at the earliest) or by the time they 
reach retirement (65); 
• benefits may take the form of a lifetime annuity or a disbursement plan combined 
with a lifetime annuity from the age of 85; 
• 30 per cent of the accumulated capital may be paid out as a lump-sum amount at the 
end of the deferred period; 
• benefits must guarantee a minimum amount; 
                                                 
33 The reasons for the reform can be summarized into three points: sustainable contribution rates, secure 
the long-term stability of pension amounts (the target is to reduce the current level of pensions 70% of the 
net salary to approximately 67 percent between 2011 and 2030; larger acceptance of supplementary 
pension arrangements. For further information see Borsch-Supan, A.H. and Wilke, C.B (2003) on The 
German Public Pension System : How it was, How it will be  
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• contracting commissions must be spread equally over a period of at least 10 years; 
• significant administrative cost, legal and transparency requirements; 
• the 2006 rule imposed equal premium rates for both man and women. 
2.3.2.5 The French case 
The muti-pillar model  
The French pension system represents a classic example of the Bismarckian pension 
regime, mostly concentrated in the public pension sector, and organized as following:   
• First pillar – consisting in a mandatory general scheme financed on a PAYG basis 
and focused in an earnings-related contributions scheme that cover almost all 
population.  
• Second pillar – representing supplementary schemes at the company level. In 2003, 
his pillar suffered significant developments. Notably, the 2003 Raffarin reform 
introduced the collective retirement savings plan (Plan d’épargne retraite collectif 
(PERCO)), developed by companies in order to offer employees an alternative 
scheme to the traditional public pension provision.  
• Third pillar – referring to voluntary funded schemes at the individual level. 
Overview on the third pillar  
The 2003 Raffarin reform established the personal retirement savings plans (Plan 
d’épargne retraite personnalisé (PERP34)) which corresponds, mainly, to an insurance plan 
administered by insurance companies, provident institutions or mutual organisations, under the 
supervision of a committee designed to secure a fairly execution of PERP contracts.  
The PERP is a pension complement accumulated during individual’s working period, 
whose benefits are only available by the time of retirement or at the age of 60. The scheme may 
take the form of:  
                                                 
34 Until 2003, the personal retirement savings plan was know as Plan d’épargne individue pour la  
retraite (PEIR) (Law Nr.775/2003, of 21st of August ). However, Decree-Law Nr.346/2004 renamed it to 
Plan d’épargne retraite personnalisé (PERP).  
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1) life annuity contract but in deferred terms, allowing individuals to directly purchase 
their accrued rights in a deferred basis; 
2) a private income contract, in unit terms, allowing individuals to purchase points of 
private income which will be thus liquidated in a lump-sum payment; 
3) a multi-support contract, allowing individuals to constitute an amount of savings 
which will be, eventually, converted into a life annuity. 
This type of product is capital guaranteed due to a rule of progressive security on individual’s 
accrued rights near retirement,so that : 
1) less than two years before the retirement of the subscriber, at least 90 % of the 
collected savings must be guaranteed by the PERP sponsor;  
2) between two and five years, this part is at the very least 80 %;  
3) between five and 10 years, it is at the very least 65 %;  
4) between 10 and 20 years, it is at the very least 40 %. 
Contributions made (by each household member) to a personal retirement savings plan 
subscribed before December 31st are tax deductible up to an annual limit amount equal to: 
• 10 % of the income35 derived from a professional occupation (after a 10 % depression 
for professional expenses) during the previous year or, alternatively, 10% of the social 
security ceiling36of the previous year (in case of PERP small return’s or default). 
2.3.2.6 The Spanish case  
The multi-pillar model 
 The Spanish pension architecture covers a multi-pillar model, centred in a public 
pension provision and two other supplementary schemes37, planned as following: 
                                                 
35 This income amount is constrained to eight times the Plafond Annuel de Securité Sociale (PASS). In 
2007, the maximum tax deduction was approximately 25747 Euros (26620 Euros for 2008). 
36 Plafond Annuel de Securité Sociale (PASS). 
37 In 1995, the Toledo agreement introduced several reforming measures in order to monitor and improve 
the deficit-process of the Spanish social security. One of this measures consisted in the boost of 
supplementary pension schemes.   
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• First Pillar – is a state and mandatory pillar financed on a PAYG basis, represented by 
an earnings-related contributions scheme that covers dependent and independent 
employees. It also provides a basic safety net to individuals in need, which consists in a 
means-tested benefit scheme. 
• Second pillar – it includes a private supplementary scheme. Notably, occupational 
schemes based on collective agreements.  
• Third pillar – it comprises a private and voluntary scheme designed to 
complement the public pension provision.  
Overview on the third pillar  
The third pillar of the Spanish pension system is constituted, among other schemes, by 
personal and voluntary retirement savings accounts in which individuals or participants carry 
out contributions (periodic or extraordinary) with a long-term objective of  providing a 
retirement income that will be able to serve as private complement to the benefits that stem from 
the public pension provision. These schemes cover contingencies upon:  
1) retirement; 
2) invalidity;  
3) survivorship;  
4) widowhood;  
5) orphanhood. 
Pension plans from the individual system are of the defined contribution type (thus 
unlinked to past salary earnings) and may be administered by pension funds management 
entities, investment funds institutions, credit and insurance companies, under the supervision of 
Dirección General de Seguros y Fondos de Pensiones (DGSFP). Since these pension schemes 
are of defined contribution type, fund’s return is uncertain and will be a function, among others 
things, of the contributions carried out by participants and, at the same time, of the profit value 
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of investments conducted by investment managers. These types of plans tend to be not capital 
guaranteed.  
The subscription of these pension schemes is encouraged through a tax relief.  Notably, 
contributions are tax deductible up to a maximum amount38 of: 1) 10000 Euros/ year for 
participants under 50 years and 2) 12500 Euros/year for participants over 50 years old. As for 
the benefits paid, the tax shelter will vary in accordance to how the scheme’s returns are 
perceived (if in the form of a lump-sum income, of capital39 or mixed). 
 
3. Personal Retirement Saving Plans 
3.1 Legal and Regulatory framework 
Since the 80’s, the legal framework of the Portuguese pension system is characterized 
by a significant shift from the public pension provisions towards private savings arrangements, 
representing an historical move in government’s responsibility of securing the old-age cohorts. 
In 1989, Decree-Law Nr.205/89, of 5th August, set up a system of personal retirement 
saving plans (PRSP)40 that, through voluntary contributions – generously encouraged by tax 
incentives – granted long-term savings strategies as well as choices of capital allocation to their 
subscribers. The relevance of these saving plans was justified by their ability to stimulate saving 
habits on households and, at the same time, support the public system in securing a 
complementary pension income for the old-age. Apart from providing tax shelter to pension 
savings, personal retirement savings funds (PRSF)41 may take the form of: 
                                                 
38 The restrictions added in the 2007 pension plans regulation also inform that the annual limit (for 
individuals under 50) is constrained to 30% of the net yields derived from professional and economic 
activities (the pharmacy) perceived individually during the exercise. In the case of taxpayers over 50 
years old, the previously limit augments to 50%. 
39 If in the form of capital, participants may deduct 40% of the contributions made to a personal 
retirement saving scheme until 31st December 2006.  
40 Or planos de poupança reforma (PPR). PRSP are constituted by nominative certificates estimated on a 
daily basis corresponding to the coefficient between the net value of PRSP amount and the number of 
nominative certificates in circulation. Meaning that they are vulnerable to the evolution of the assets that 
compose the PRSP portfolio as well to fluctuations in the financial markets. 
41 Or fundos de poupança reforma (FPR). These funds are exempted from collective income taxation 
(IRC) but are subject to commissions on: 1) subscription, 2) managing, 3) transfers and 4) withdrawals. 
See the Fiscal Benefits Status. 
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1. an investment fund on PRSP (managed by investment management companies, 
under the supervision of Portuguese Securities Market Commission and the Bank of 
Portugal); 
2. a pension fund on PRSP (managed by pension fund management companies and 
life insurance companies, under the control and supervision of the Portuguese 
Insurance Institute (PII) – which is the Portuguese Insurance and Pension Funds 
Supervisory Authority); 
3. a life insurance on PRSP (managed by life insurance companies, under the control 
and supervision of the PII ); 
based on individual or collective agreements (in favour or on behalf of their workers), in which 
participants are required to provide a minimum, regular or non-regular, contribution in exchange 
for scheme’s net returns42. 
The attractiveness of PRSP can be attributed to the tax deductions received through personal 
income tax (PIT)43. The PIT provides that contributions to a PRSP deposit are, within a certain 
limits, exempted from taxation, but withdrawals, including capital and cumulative income, are 
tax constrained. Nevertheless, the tax treatment associated to PRSP deposits benefit from a 
favourable fiscal regime as well as from a special rule designed to lessen the progressiveness 
effect in case capital is withdrawn.  
Simultaneously, Ministerial Order Nr.872-A/89, of 9th October, approved the juridical 
regime of the PRSP implemented by the previous legal document.   
Decree-Law Nr.145/90, of 7th May, amended the Decree-Law Nr.205/89, of 5th August, by 
establishing specific rules to the asset allocation policy of a PRSP, namely: 
1. a minimum of 2% in cash, bank deposits, T-bills and other applications in the 
interbanking markets; 
2. a minimum of 50% in public debt with a maturity longer than one year; 
                                                 
42 The participation on the PRSP profits will depend, among other factors, on the risk associated to each 
savings fund.  
43 Or imposto sobre o rendimento singular (IRS).  
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3. a maximum of 20% in documents representing mortgage bonds, provided that the 
loan attributed to each individual does not represent more than 5%; 
4. a maximum of 25% in shares, issued by a company quoted in stock market, 
including in this percentage the possibility to invest up to 10% in foreign securities 
quoted in the stock market of a representative EU-member;    
5.  a maximum of 5% in shares, issued by a Portuguese company which is not quoted 
in the stock market  
and by maintaining the upper limits (Decree-Law Nr.205/89) applied  to PRSP hold in the form 
of: 1) life insurance funds, 2) investment funds and 3)  pension funds. Simultaneously, the 
present law exempted44 from taxation the benefit received in the event of premature death of a 
PRSP participant.    
Later, Decree-Law Nr.415/91, of 25th October, addressed greater elasticity45 and additional 
improvements to pension funds status quo, particularly by pursuing a strategy that: 
1) encourages the participation of more than one managing entity in a same closed pension 
fund,  
2) allows different schemes to be financed by a common pension fund,  
3) distinguishes two types of pension funds: closed pension funds46 and open pension 
funds47.  
The idea was simply to permit pension plan sponsors to hold diversified assets managed by 
other companies.  
Rule Nr.298/91, of 13th October, classified PRSP (hold in the form of pension funds) as 
open-end schemes, individually subscribed and administered by institutions that may (or not) 
                                                 
44 Benefits received by the heirs are exempted from the succession and donation tax.  
45 Indeed, this law provided less bureaucracy to pension funds constitution as it does not require a public 
deed for subscription, only requiring the official publication of the contract terms concerning closed 
pension funds and the regulatory terms on open pension funds. 
46 Closed pension funds – refers to only one pension plan sponsor or a number of sponsors directly related 
to each other.  
47 Open pension funds – allows for a collective or a singular affiliation without the need for any link 
between the sponsors. The net value of these funds is divided into certification units. 
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assume the investment risk48. In case of risk coverage, their solvency margin is constrained to 
4% of the total amounts earned on the PRSP. In case of default, it is constrained to 1% of PRSP 
returns.     
In 1995, Decree-Law Nr.204/95, of 5th August, set up the legal regime of the Equity Savings 
Plans (Eq.SP)49. By definition, an Eq.SP is a personal savings plan, divided in shares, and 
designed to:  
1) develop the Portuguese capital market,  
2) encourage lifecycle investments schemes,  
3) build up alternative financing procedures to support companies in an international 
context. 
 Decree-Law Nr.357/99, of 15th September, introduced the Educational Savings Plans (ESP)50. 
These schemes are represented by:  
1. nominative certificates of a retirement/educational savings fund with an educational and 
retirement component (E/RSF)  
2. nominative certificates of an educational savings fund (ESF), exclusively addressed to 
the educational feature. 
The goal of this law was to extend education to all citizens by allowing individuals to enjoy 
from further tax advantageous and, at the same time, finance educational expenses, by 
transferring the sums invested in PRSF to ESF (or to E/RSF) or transforming PRSF into E/RSF; 
hence, increasing the mobility across personal savings plans. 
Decree-Law Nr.158/2002, of 2nd July, aggregated savings plan legal framework, in 
order to clear the juridical regime associated to PRSP, ESP and E/RSP schemes. It used 
previous experiences to review the legal requirements of E/RSP regarding schemes asset 
                                                 
48 Investment risk – is the possibility that, by the time of retirement, the savings amount will be 
insufficient due to the weak performance of the assets that compose their lifetime income accumulation 
(Bodie, 1990). 
49 Or planos de poupança em acções (PPA). 
50 Planos de Poupança-Educação (PPE). 
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allocation policy. Notably, it eliminated the minimum limits that could be applied in public debt 
and augmented the percentage of shares allowed in a fund portfolio.  
Ministerial Order Nr.1451/2002, of 11th November, determined that a scheme’s net 
return is determined by its asset51 allocation policy which is in compliance with the following 
rules and limits:  
a. a maximum of 55% in shares, convertible bonds or any other assets which confer 
the right to subscribe shares or the chance to be exposed to stock markets 
environment (whereas above 40% they may include in their designation the 
expression PRSP - Equity); 
b. notwithstanding the previous statement, the investment in such assets and in bond 
type instruments (excluding, participation in collective investment institutions 
which are not priced in the security market of any EU or OECD members) must not 
represent more than 10% of E/RSP portfolio; 
c. notwithstanding the statement in a), a maximum of 5% may be represented (by 
participation in collective investment institutions) in securities that do not fulfil the 
EC requirements ( Rule Nr. 85/611/EEC, of 20th December); 
d. a maximum of 20% in short-term debt instruments, bank deposits and other 
monetary instruments; 
e. in the case of a saving fund hold in the form of a security investment fund, a 
maximum of 20% in real estate funds, whereas in the form of a pension fund or of 
an autonomous fund from a life assurance branch, a maximum of 20% of the funds 
                                                 
51 According to art.3 of the Decree-Law Nr.158/2002 this assets may be: 
1. securities, 
2. units in collective investment institutions,  
3. short-term debt instruments,  
4. bank deposits or other assets of a monetary nature.  
Whenever the tax deferred savings fund assumes the figure of a pension fund or of an autonomous fund 
from a life assurance branch, the net value of the savings fund may also be built up with land and 
buildings and credits inherent to mortgage loans. 
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portfolio may be invested in land and buildings assets and in participation units in 
real estate funds; 
f. in the case of a savings fund hold in the form of a pension fund or of an autonomous 
fund from a life insurance branch, a maximum of 20% in credits derived from 
mortgage loans; 
g. together, securities and commercial paper (hold within the same firm) as well as 
bonds (issued by this firm) must not represent more than 10% of the E/RSP 
portfolio, while in case of a group of firms or in the event of a management entity 
with control or group relationship this limit increases to 15%. 
Decree-Law Nr.158/2002, allowed individuals to claim their PRSP benefits whenever 
he himself or any member of his household attended or enrolled in an institution of higher 
education or professional education, as long as this generated educational expenses in the year 
in reference. This holds true when carried out each year and after subject to the annual limits52 
imposed to each student (Ministerial Order Nr.1452/2002).  
Pursuant to the terms a) to d) and f) of article 4.1 of Decree-Law Nr.158/2002, a 
scheme’s withdrawal (Ministerial Order Nr.1453/2002, of 11th November) becomes due under: 
1. retirement due to participant's age (involving individuals receiving a retirement 
income provided by any social protection regime such as the social security system 
                                                 
52 1.  2500 Euros, whenever an individual or any members of his household attends or enrols  in a 
course at an educational establishment located: 
a)In mainland Portugal, for students residing in that territory; 
b)In the Autonomous Regions of the Azores and Madeira, for students with regular residence in the same 
region where the educational establishment is located ; 
    2. 3750 Euros, whenever an individual or any members of his household attends or enrols  in a 
course at an educational establishment located: 
c)In mainland Portugal, for students with regular residence in the Autonomous Regions of the Azores and 
Madeira; 
d)In the Autonomous Regions of the Azores and Madeira, for students with regular residence in mainland 
Portugal; 
e)In the Autonomous Regions of the Azores and Madeira, for students with regular residence in another 
Autonomous Region which does not coincide to the one where the educational establishment is situated; 
    3. 5000 Euros, whenever an individual or any members of his household, with regular  residence in 
mainland Portugal or in the Autonomous Regions of the Azores or Madeira, attends or enrols  in a course 
at an educational establishment located abroad. 
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or the CGA system (Caixa Geral de Aposentações) and also individuals receiving a 
pre-retirement age pension); 
2. long-term unemployment (concerning dependent and independent workers that 
being able to work, are unemployed for more than 12 months and are registered on 
the employment centres); 
3. permanent inability to work (referring to individuals that: a) are eligible to an 
incapacity pension provided by any regime of Social Protection, particularly  by the 
Social Security or by the CGA; b) are entitled to a working accidents pension or 
professional sickness pension, as long as the degree of disability represents more 
than 60%; c) are under situations not mentioned above but who present a permanent 
disability to work with impact on their earnings in more than 1/3 of the wage 
correspondent to the normal working activity); 
4. severe sickness ( regarding individuals suffering from an infirmity that due to its 
profile and in line with his characteristics may originate a significant residual 
incapacity or, in the limit, a death risk); 
5.  professional education courses (granting a: 1) diploma equivalent to the regular 
secondary education diploma and a professional classification of level III, pursued 
at a public or private professional school (in the last case, an officially certificate is 
required); 2) a specialization in technology, according to the Ministerial Order 
Nr.989/99, of 3rd November, modified by the Ministerial Order Nr.698/2001, of 11th 
July and Nr.392/2002, of 12th April, conceding a professional qualification of level 
IV; 
6. higher education courses( following an academic degree (bachelor, master’s or Ph. 
D.), officially certified in: a) public institution of higher education; b) private 
institution of higher education or a co-operative institute with public interest; c) 
Catholic University of Portugal); 
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7. members of a household (with a governing responsibility, as well as the their 
dependent, according to the nº14, article 13 of the PIT Code). 
Notwithstanding the reimbursement cases described earlier, the Ministerial Order 
Nr.1453/2002, of 11th November, enumerated the means of proof required in order to satisfy the 
withdrawal requirements.  
Law Nr.32/2002, of 20th December, introduced a multi-pillar model in which 
responsibilities are shared between State, firms and individuals. The rationale behind this law is 
simply to reduce the generosity of statutory pension provision and, simultaneously, close 
pension gaps through the improvement of 2nd and 3rd pillars. Later, the Portuguese Insurance 
Institute established the regulatory terms on savings schemes, in compliance with the rules53 
regarding their reimbursement, transfers and discriminative publication of their asset portfolio 
in order to provide (participants) more information on PRSP status quo (Regulation Nr.6/2003-
R, of 12th February). 
The 2005 State budget curtailed the fiscal benefits associated to PRSP. Thus, at the current 
conjuncture, PRSP contribution amounts were expected to decrease, flowing towards other life-
cycle accumulation savings. However, PRSP deposits reached a growth rate of 15%. For many 
economists, the increase in PRSP participation was compensated by household’s greater 
reliance on private pension provision to fund their retirement years. For pension fund managers, 
the rise of PRSP was due to: 
                                                 
53 For each pension fund– personal retirement savings fund (PRSF), education savings fund (ESF) and 
retirement/education savings fund (R/ESF) – operating as a savings fund support, the following aspects 
are considered: 
• discriminated composition of the asset portfolio of the savings fund; 
• the number of certificate units in circulation and the unit value at the time of the publication 
references; 
ought to be published in the bulletin of the Securities Market, on a monthly basis and referring to the last 
day of the month:  
Furthermore, every asset ,within the pension fund portfolio, requires the publishing of elements reporting 
to: 
• designation of the value; 
• amounts in portfolio; 
• pricing; 
• interest amounts in Euros; 
• total amount of the portfolio value, including outstanding interest, in Euros. 
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1. announcement, by the end of 2005 (election year), of the reintroduction of fiscal 
advantages for 2006.  
2. transposition of the Savings Directive NR.2003/48/EC54, allowing immigrants to 
pool and transfer their investments into life products managed by national entities.  
Decree-Law Nr.12/2006, of 20th January, transposed, into the Portuguese legal structure, the 
Directive Nr.2003/41/EC, dated 3rd June, of both the European Parliament and of the European 
Council, regarding the activities and the supervision of the institutions responsible for the 
provision of professional pension plans. In the course of this implementation, successive 
amendments with respect to pension plans investment policy, evolution of the arrangement 
rights and, ultimately, financial standing of the pension funds were applied to private pension 
arrangements. As for open pension funds55, the possibility to trade funds managed by a 
management entity was recognized, as well as the right to perform subscription transfers 
(portability), in cases of: 1)substantial change of the investment policy, 2)increasing costs and 
3) funds transfers. 
Moreover, R/ESP and Eq.SP hold in the form of pension funds were henceforth, classified as 
open pension funds, only allowing individual subscription. Consequently, the present law 
followed the prudential rules of the EC Directive as to the assets composition and to the 
estimation of responsibilities by stressing the establishment of two governing structures within 
the pension funds, namely:  
• a committee with the purpose of escorting the 2nd Pillar funds insight, and 
• a tutor56 for the participants and beneficiaries subscribing the 3rd pillar system. 
                                                 
54 Decree-Law 62/2005. 
55 In the context where the company does not cover their make-up, the minimum solvency against the 
individual subscription to an open pension fund, a R/ESP or an Eq.SP in the form of pension funds is the 
equivalent to a 1% amount of the market-share of the fund corresponding to the individual subscriptions 
and the amount of the R/ESP and Eq.SP hold as pension funds. 
56 In 24th of May 2007 it was, officially, established the tutor position with a core objective of protecting  
PRSP and open pension funds participants, whose funds are managed by management entities within the 
Portuguese Association of Investment Funds, Pensions and Capital (PAIFPC). Note that, in the case of 
PRSP hold in the form of life insurance, participants interests are protected by the fact that capital is 
guaranteed. 
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These two governing structures may facilitate the development of pension funds supply or even 
improve households demand for pension funds, if they happen to be sufficiently skilled to 
provide (participants) complete information on the asset prices, capital returns and longevity 
risk so as to insure them against the uncertainties that are in the origin of the asymmetric 
information problems opposing savings fund managers (i.e.: pension plan sponsors and 
investment managers) and participants.  
On balance, over the last two decades, a number of legal documents have been produced 
to facilitate the establishment of personal retirement savings plans. At the same time, 
policymakers have assumed an on-going position of improving and adjusting the current 
legislation to pension funds management needs and to economic environment. This fact was 
many times reflected in the amendments suffered by the rules covering the asset composition of 
PRSP portfolio (Annex 1). 
 
3.2 Tax treatment of PRSP 
The tax treatment of these savings plans is considered as favourable when it deviates from a 
fiscal regime that treats all other forms of life-cycle accumulation as equal, pointing towards an 
EET scheme (Antolin et al., 2004) – “exempt-exempt-taxed” cropped up: 
1. at the entry level – subsidizing57 the PRSP deposits in such manner that participants 
benefit from a tax deferment granted through personal income tax (PIT) for each 
contribution paid from and within a certain limit58  (20% of the total gross income 
applied in retirement saving plans) as long as the savings amount keeps on being 
invested for a minimum period of five years (Table 5).  
Depending on the contributor’s age and on the investment amount59,   
                                                 
57 Since 2nd of January of 2007, retirees are not entitled to tax benefits associated to PRS plans 
58 See Articles 14º and 21º of Fiscal Benefit Status. 
59 That is: 
1) an individual younger than 35 years old who invests until to 2000 Euros in PPR plans, may deduct no 
more than 400Euros from it;  
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i) the limit value for tax deduction should not exceed in 2007: 
400 Euros per each subscriber younger than 35; 
350 Euros per each subscriber aged 35 to 50; 
300 Euros per each subscriber older than 50. 
ii) and the tax form, an  investment income higher than: 
1500 Euros per each subscriber younger than 35; 
1750 Euros per each subscriber aged 35 to 50; 
2000 Euros per each subscriber older than 50.  
Table 5: Overview on PRSP fiscal regime 
 
Source: APS (2005) 
 
2. at the withdrawal level– when the withdrawal is carried out under: 
• retirement due to the participant's age, only if the savings fund is subscribed within 
less than 5 years;  
• educational expenses60 (with professional and higher education courses), only if the 
savings fund is subscribed within less than 5 years and the withdrawal is 
constrained to an annual limit for each scholar; 
• long-term unemployment of the subscriber or any other member of his household 
(longer than 12 months and filled at the Employment Centre); 
                                                                                                                                               
2) an individual aged 35 to 50 who invests up to 1750Euros in PPR plans, may deduct no more than 
350Euros from it;  
3) an individual older than 50 who invests up to 1500Euros, may deduct no more than 300Euros. 
60 Since 1st of January 2006, every single subscription filed with the PIT, should not be withdrawn for 
educational purposes, so that it does not give rise to any fiscal loss. Additionally, subscription made since 
1st of January 2007 cannot be used for educational withdrawals.    
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• permanent inability to work of the subscriber or any other member of his household; 
• severe sickness of the subscriber or any other member of his household; 
• at the age 60, only if the savings fund is subscribed within less than 5 years; 
• death of the subscriber (so that the heirs are entitle to reimbursement ).   
If the withdrawal occurs under circumstances other than the above mentioned, it is 
assessed as an early withdrawal so that the contributor would have to return the corresponding 
tax deductions and a further 10% for each year or fraction passed since then.  Consequently, 
when the withdrawal takes place in the first five years of the contract, the income tax rate is 
20%. When the withdrawal occurs between the 5th and the 8th year after the first PRSP deposit, 
the investment income is taxed at 16%, provided that at least 35% of the contributions were 
subscribed in the first half of the contract. From the 8th year on, an income tax rate of 8% 
applies to the PRSP investment income as long as at least 35% of the contributions took place in 
the first half of the contract.  
The capital gains may be withdrawn (by participants or heirs) in the form of: 
• a lump-sum amount (entirely or partially), periodically or not, classified as capital 
income61 (category E in PIT) and autonomously constrained to a 8% tax rate (20% x 
2/5 of income obtained), in case it results from contributions made after 31st of 
December 2005; 
• a monthly life pension, converting the final compounded capital into an annuity that 
prevails until the subscriber’s death. In this case, the income is filed as pension 
income (category H in PIT) and taxes are withheld at the source.  
• a combination of the two later alternatives, so that a fraction of the compounded 
capital is received by the time of withdrawal and the other part is transformed into a 
perpetual income. In the case of the lump-sum amount, an 8% tax rate is applied, 
while the lifetime income is added to the other income forms. 
                                                 
61 The contributor is not obliged to file with the IRS as long as capital is withdrawn as a lump-sum receipt 
of the investment income. 
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Prior to 2006, the effective tax rate focused on (20%*1/5 of income obtained), thereby this 
increase has been seen among economists as an incentive measure to lock savings until PRSP 
contract maturity. At this moment, only 2/5 of the investment income, obtained as a lump-sum 
amount, are taxed at 20%, meaning that benefits emerging from these savings schemes are taxed 
at an effective rate of 8%, a lesser rate than the one applied to fixed bank deposits (20%) 
(Rodrigues and Silva (2005).  
 
 
3.3 The importance of PRSP 
3.3.1 Evolution 
Over the last decades, the evolution of PRSP in Portugal has been determined by: 
• on one side, and in common with what is taking place in several countries, social 
security inability to provide, on her own, an adequate level of retirement income; 
• on the other side, the striking fact that savings has been decreasing, significantly. 
Besides these two factors, which sustain the legal framework, there are others features which 
have contributed greatly to PRSP progress, specifically pension funds market immaturity and 
the singular fiscal treatment associated to PRSP, which has attracted fund management 
institutions ever since (Table 6). 
Table 6: Fund management institutions and pension funds  
 
Source: Pension Funds Statistics (2006), PII 
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3.3.1.1 Participants and beneficiaries 
A look at table 7 shows that the recent number of individuals participating in an E/RSP has 
significantly risen to, approximately, the double registered in 2001. Indeed, the growth rate in 
the number of PRSP and /or E/RSP participants has reached the average level of the past 5 
years, highlighting the atypical movement of E/RSP growth in 2005. As for PRSP financing 
vehicle, participants prefer to concentrate there savings in the form of life insurance than in the 
form of pension funds and investment funds (since they may benefit from a compounded 
interest over their lifetime and capital is guaranteed). 
Table 7: Participation per E/RSP financing vehicle 
 
Source: Report on the Insurance Sector and Pension Funds (2006), PII 
 
Thus, household’s greater reliance on private pension savings is supported by PRSP 
participation rates over total and active population (Figure 6).  






2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Participants of PRSP over the total pop.
Participants of PRSP over the active pop.
 
Source: Report on the Insurance Sector and Pension Funds (2006), PII 
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However, shifting longevity risk towards pension fund sponsors will depend on State’s on-going 
policies to foster complementary pension provision.  
A look at table 8 shows that, there is a relationship between the weight of beneficiaries 
and benefits paid per type of pension funds. In 2006, 4,36% of beneficiaries and 4,6% of 
benefits paid were reported to the educational/retirement savings plans. Moreover, retirement 
benefits become due under retirement circumstances. Meaning that individuals (enrolled in 
E/RSP scheme) have accumulated wealth during their lifetime by locking their personal savings 
for resources in retirement. 
Table 8: Beneficiaries and type of benefits paid per E/RSP hold in the form of pension funds 
 
 Source: Report on the Insurance Sector and Pension Funds (2006), PII 
(1) Other – includes the reimbursements occurred under circumstances not mentioned above. 
 
3.3.1.2 E/RSP financing vehicles 
Figure 7 results suggest that the amounts invested in E/RSP have declined within pension 
funds and augmented greatly within life insurance, meaning that participants prefer to hold 
E/RSP in the form of life insurance and receive an actuarially fair annuity (less risky) upon 
retirement.  



























2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Life insurance Investiment Funds Pension Funds  
Source: Report on the Insurance Sector and Pension Funds (2006), PII 
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3.3.1.3 Return of E/RSP financing vehicles 
Another important aspect to take into account refers to E/RSP performance per financing 
vehicles, using as analytical indicator their return rates. Figure 8 shows that the average return62 
rate on E/RSP was, approximately, 3,8%, while the return per E/RSP  financing vehicle 
balanced between the maximum percentage of 4,2% within pension funds and the lowest 
estimation of 3,01%  within investment funds. By comparing the returns of E/RSP per financing 
vehicles with their correspondent growth rates, it is easy to see that the improvement observed 
within E/RSP invested amounts was due to an increase in the number of participants and not to a 
better financial performance. 








































Annual return Annual growth rate 
 
Source: Report on the Insurance Sector and Pension Funds (2006), PII 
Note1: PPR/E is equivalent to the English designation - E/RSP 
 
3.3.1.4 Structure of E/RSP portfolio per financing vehicles 
The investment rules applied for E/RSP continued to be the ones prescribed by Decree-Law 
Nr.158/2002 and the Ministerial Order Nr.1451/2002.Table 9 depicts the structure of E/RSP 
portfolio per financing vehicle. Such structure differs fairly among the three financing vehicles.  
                                                 
62 The data was collected using the monthly statistical time series published in“Boletim de Cotações” of 
Euronext Lisbon. Taking into account the monthly returns on open pension funds, ISP estimated the 
annual rate returns using geometric average method (that is, assuming that the returns obtained in each 
period would be totally reinvested in the following period) and adjusting it to inflows/outflows effects 
regarding the amounts invested in E/RSP. Moreover, the data respecting E/RSP hold in the form of 
investment funds was collected within PAIFPC.  
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Table 9: Structure of E/RSP Portfolio per financing vehicles 
 
Source: Report on the Insurance Sector and Pension Funds (2006), PII 
 
In 2006, life insurance funds concentrated their E/RSP portfolio in assets referring to 
commercial paper and bonds (44,3%), followed by public debt securities and equivalent 
(33,7%). Together, these financial assets represent 78% of the total portfolio (71,6% in the case 
of investment funds and 64, 9% for pension funds). As for investment funds, more than half of 
the E/RSP portfolio is invested in commercial paper and bonds (51,5%, pursued by public debt 
securities and equivalent, though with a smaller weight (20,5%)).  As for pension funds, the 
structure of E/RSP portfolio contemplates three types of assets: public debt securities and 
equivalent (35,9%), commercial paper and bonds (29%) and last, nominative certificates in an 
investment fund (22,9%). The current results are in line with the ceiling limits imposed to 
E/RSP as well as with the rules on prudent diversification63.   
                                                 
63 While the preference for government debt may improve market efficiency and lead to the development 
of longer-term investments, concentrating it in government debt may fail to capture the benefits provided 
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3.4 Criticisms to PRSP status quo 
On the issue of complementary pension provision, some studies have identified the 
distortions associated to PRSP status quo and concluded that retirement saving incentives are 
far from being effective and may severely affect pension plans value chain as they imply:  
a. Budgetary costs – According to 2004 OECD research, the tax benefits associated to 
these savings schemes are financially perverse in the sense that they valuate today’s 
taxed outflows more than today’s valuation of the inflows that result from taxing 
voluntary retirement savings plans (third Pillar). Indeed, the State subsidizes in 20% the 
total gross income invested in PRSP plans (below ceiling limits) and only taxes 8 % of 
the interest income by the time of withdrawal. In theory, budgetary costs would decline 
if tax incentives appeared to have foster new savings. However, the effectiveness of 
PRSP in raising private savings remains unclear. Moreover, while individual’s income 
is secure until retirement, national government looses fiscal revenues to finance their 
public deficit. In such circumstances, “PRSP effectiveness to increase national saving 
only occurs when the increase in private savings is higher than the negative impact in 
public saving of a greater deficit or a reduction in the superavit of the public sector.”64 
b. Discrimination against lower-income households – Given that, the tax relief on PRSP 
contributions takes the form of a tax deduction, the value of savings benefits decreases 
with income levels.  For individuals with low income, saving may be neither accessible 
nor optimal. Furthermore, in countries with a highly redistributive public pension 
system where lower-income individuals face relatively high replacement rates the 
incentives to join tax-favoured schemes for low income individuals is reduce. Rodrigues 
and Silva (2005) used the 2003 personal income tax simulator and found evidence that 
“for households with a gross monthly income until 1.2 times the statutory minimum 
                                                                                                                                               
by diversification. From a macroeconomic perspective, pensions invested mostly in such assets present 
little difference from statutory pension provision. 
64 See Gouveia (1997) p.5. 
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wage, the State does not reward at all the effort they make in contributing towards a 
PRSP”65. Gouveia findings also confirm these results. 
c. Low coverage – Since PRSP tax incentives are not uniform across income levels, it 
follows that PRSP coverage will be effectively heterogeneous so that low-income 
households will be less exposed to saving incentives than their high income 
counterparts. Rodrigues and Silva (2005) used personal income tax microdata and 
estimated that “only 6 per cent of all households where the main taxpayer is between 25 
and 64 contributed towards a PRSP in 2000”66. 
d. PRSP tax shelter may influence individual’s portfolio strategy – The latter authors 
argued that some individuals may use personal retirement savings funds as fixed deposit 
with a more smoothness tax payment, since in case of an early withdrawal scenario they 
would be less penalized than if they had invested in an ordinary fixed deposit that 
charges, at the end of each year, a 20% rate on the capital returns earned until the early 
withdrawal. This holds true for individuals that happen to declare low gross earnings, as 
the tax deduction would be constrained to only 2/5 of the investment income taxed at 
20% and therefore, the return of the corresponding tax deductions and a further 10% for 
each year or fraction passed would minimize the discipline impinged on early 
withdrawals. Moreover, Rodrigues and Silva (2005) findings point out that taxpayer 
gains are smaller when early withdrawals occurs in the early stage and when the return 
of the corresponding tax deductions are rather high.  
e. portability costs of moving to other companies – The saving incentives associated to 
PRSP have helped banks and insurance companies to maximize their profits by simply 
exploiting the portability cost associated to PRSP and, consequently, charging high 
commissions to PRSP participants. PRSP life insurance and PRSP funds claim 2,4 and 
                                                 
65 See Rodrigues and Silva (2005, p.62). 
66 See Rodrigues and Silva (2005, p.63). 
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1,9%, on average, for each subscription made at the entry level67. If we take into 
account schemes’ returns per PRSP financing vehicles we may find these costs 
relatively high. Furthermore, if an individual is discontent with his PRSP performance 
he may transfer the invested amount to other entity, provided that he pays a “penalty” 
for the withdrawal. In some cases, the transfer commission is roughly 5% of the 
withdrawal amount, which eliminates any return advantage obtained with an alternative 
PRSP application.   
3.5 An alternative to PRSP 
In recent years, policymakers have embarked on a significant reform of the old-age 
retirement program, regarding the creation of a system based on Social Security personal 
retirement accounts (Decree-Law Nr. 26/2008, of 22nd of February). The goal is to grant a 
supplementary income for retirement, provided that individual’s subscription takes place in 
early times and that their investment return rate is relatively high. This goal would be achieved 
through contributions deposited in a personal retirement account that, once converted into 
retirement certificates, integrate an autonomous fund managed (under a capitalization regime) 
by a public entity68.  The benefit receipt becomes due under retirement conditions or under 
effective and permanent incapacity circumstances. Thus, participants may choose to:   
1. convert the cumulative capital, deposited in their individual retirement account, into 
a life income; or 
2. withdraw the cumulative capital; or even 
3. transfer the cumulative capital for a saving plan hold by their children and spouse. 
The later two options may be partially acquainted; so long the reminiscent capital is sufficiently 
high to allow converting it into a life income.  It was considered suitable the establishment of a 
minimum 10% of the social assistance indexation. If participants choose to convert the 
cumulative capital into a life income, the amount of income will depend mostly of: 
                                                 
67 These numbers are in accordance with the 2007 data collected from the Portuguese institution 
responsible for the protection of consumers’ rights, that is DECO. 
68 The CFMISS (Capitalization Fund Management Institute of Social Security). 
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• average life expectancy indicator at the time of retirement; 
• personal account balance sheet.   
Defenders of private PRSP status quo are battling vigorously against the virtual advantages of 
the current reform. And the fact that public opinion is increasingly sympathetic69 towards 
retirement certificates makes it easy the enactment of a system of personalized retirement 
accounts. Publicly managed personal retirements accounts may very well respond to critics 
pointed out in later discussion and, simultaneously, amplify additional uncertainties regarding 
liquidity and investment policy (Annex 2).  
Contributions to public PRSP are inelastic and locked up until retirement or permanent 
inability. Employees of private and public sector are required to contribute an amount of 2% to 
6% of their monthly average salary, together with the ordinary contributions made to Social 
Security system. According to data collected within the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Cohesion, during the first days after the announcement of the enactment of Social Security 
personal retirement accounts70, it was verified that most of the subscribers had chosen to deliver 
4% or 6% of their average salary, while only 28,4% of the Portuguese preferred to discount 2% 
on the public saving plans.  
The results suggest that individuals participating in retirement certificates appear to face 
less stringent liquidity constraints (as they are opting to perform higher discounts) and could 
belong to the old age population as earnings tend to increase with the age structure and a 6% 
target-discount is generally reported to workers older than 50, since this is their only option to 
contribute to public PPR plans (Figure 9). 
 
 
                                                 
69 Since 1st of March 2008 (day of announcement of Social Security Personal Retirement Accounts) and 
until 7th of April, roughly 3100 retirement certificates were subscribed, according to data collected within 
Ministry of Labour and Social Cohesion. Furthermore, half of the subscribers reported a monthly average 
salary of 1222€ and almost 1/3 of the subscribers had less than 40 years old.   
70 The data refers to statistics collected until 24th of March 2008 within Ministry of Labour and Social 
Cohesion. 
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Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Cohesion (2008) 
 
With regard to withdrawals, public PRSP when converted into an annuity confers 
individuals the opportunity to choose for conditional payments to heirs within the first three 
months, in the case of premature death of a subscriber. This option is rarely available in the 
private sector. Also, if the death occurs during the savings accumulation period, heirs are 
entitled with the total savings stock available in retirement certificates without incurring in 
bureaucracy expenses as the ones imposed by private entities. However, the welfare gains of 
converting the earnings into an annuity or any other form of capital accumulation are penalized 
by public’s PRSP investment policy. This is due to the limits imposed to public PRSP portfolio 
assets which require: 
• a minimum of 50%  application on public debt71  
• a maximum of 40%  application on  private debt 
• a maximum of 25%  application on stocks 
• a maximum of 10%  application on real state 
• a maximum of 15%  application on foreign currency uncoverage, as long as it 
comes from countries within European Union or OECD.  
                                                 
71 So long 25% of this investment is concentrated in Portuguese public debt. This portfolio composition 
may be interpreted as a public form of financing the State. 
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The highlights go for the ceiling limit imposed on stocks (25% of portfolio), which confer a 
moderate risk72 profile to retirement certificates. Meaning that individuals participating in these 
savings schemes are not likely to invest in risky assets that could leave them more vulnerable to 
fluctuations in asset prices (Figure 10). 











Source: Social Security 
Note1: The data refers to cumulative amounts projected for the years from 2008 to 2010. 
 
Another important fact is that retirement certificates together with private PRSP are not 
capital guarantee (excluding, most of PRSF hold in the form of a life insurance), consequently 
their performance will depend mainly on the investment that is made by the fund that is 
managing individuals’ savings. In the case of public PRSP, the portfolio is modest, though the 
risk is always present and there is no guarantee that the returns obtained in the past will assure 
future outcomes. Furthermore, the returns on retirement certificates depend on the managing 
performance of the Capitalization Fund Management Institute of Social Security (CFMISS) 
which is expected to overcome the returns associated to private PRSP.  
According to the last three to five years, the returns from the trust fund managed by the 
CFMISS prevailed over the average returns of private PRSP (whether in the form of life 




                                                 
72 Note that, a financial product is considered as having a high risk profile, whenever it is widely held in 
stocks 
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Last  5 years Last 3 years Last  year
The average of Private PPR funds The average of Private PPR life insurances
Estimation on Public PPR  
Source: DECO. 
Note1: For further information see the article on public PRSP in Diário Económico, 4th March 2008, 
pp.4-6. According to the information gathered, the sample returns exclude PRSP fiscal benefits and were 
estimated before taxes using an annualized formula.  
 
Nevertheless, public PRSP portfolios restrict individuals risk profile and also fund’s return to 
one possibility – moderate profile – while private sector schemes tend to offer three types of 
risk profiles: conservative, moderate and dynamic. This portfolio constraint may penalize the 
return, since there may be better financial performances in the private market. 
Having addressed the investment policy problem, a greater concern arises from the tax 
treatment of retirement certificates. Supporters of private PRSP status quo argue that public 
PRSP are against consumer interests since they allow the accumulation of private PRSP fiscal 
benefits with the retirement certificates tax incentives, but they forbid the accumulation of two 
PRSP from the private sector (i.e.: assuming a saver is investing up to the maximum amount 
allowed and he has one PRSP and one retirement certificate, than the saver is expected to obtain 
a maximum cumulative benefit of 750€ (400€ and 350€, respectively). However, if he has two 
private PRSP, it is likely that he will attain a 400€ fiscal benefit. This suggests a discrimination 
against the holding of more than one private PRSP).  
Under these arguments, personal retirement accounts are expected to compete with 
private savings in the provision of a pension complement73 by: 
                                                 
73 Since contributions to public pension complement provision are automatic and locked up until 
retirement or permanent inability, state’s saving programme has the virtue of encouraging effective 
retirement planning. 
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• lessening the effects of fluctuations in the capital markets (since management is 
addressed to a public entity which invests in a moderate portfolio that is expected to 
grant a 5% annual average return);  
• collecting the benefits of compound interest over their life-cycle; 
• receiving additional benefits than the ones received in the ordinary public system 
and building up a “nest egg” for retirement.  
Also, a massive participation in retirement certificates may allow governments to, under the 
Law of Great Numbers, compete with private PRSP in terms of the commissions charged at the 
entry and withdrawal levels. Simultaneously, state’s credibility among consumers averts 
individual’s financial myopia and situations of moral hazard74, given that retirement certificates 
portfolio are managed by a public entity and individuals who are not enrolled in a personal 
retirement account will continue to benefit from public pension provision. Conversely, 
participants enrolled in personal retirement accounts will not be penalized just because they set 
aside a percentage of their payroll taxes in retirement certificates.  
 
4. Performance evaluation of personal retirement savings funds (PRSF) 
4.1 Data description  
Out of the 227 total pension funds recorded during 2006, 173 are closed-ended and the 
reminiscent are open-ended funds. With regard to the open-ended pension funds, roughly 20 are 
individual retirement savings funds – PRSP and E/RSP, 4 are equity savings funds and 30 are 
classified as other open-ended funds75. Thus, the current sample size is composed by 12 actively 
traded PRSF and 8 other open-ended retirement savings schemes (Table 10), therefore they may 
be accounted as representative of the initial sample size of retirement savings plans. 
 
 
                                                 
74 Unwillingness to save given than the State will guarantee and support individuals by the time they 
reach retirement. 
75 For further information see table 6, p.46. 
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Table 10: PRSF hold in the form of pension funds and per Management Company 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
The study period is from December 2002 to December 2007, so as to examine the performance 
of these schemes over the past 5 years. The selected funds were chosen according to the level of 
complete information gathered from the EURONEXT database and also to the time series 
consistency of each PRSF.  
In order to evaluate the investment performance of PRSP it was created a new database 
containing the monthly returns of the 20 funds traded in the Portuguese capital market. This 
implies a total of 60 observations for each PRSF. Out of the 20 open-ended funds, 16 are at least 
previous to the 2002 study period, meaning that only 4 funds will present less than 60 
observations. The new estimates were obtained from EURONEXT’s database records 
concerning the daily prices of the participation units that compose each PRSF and also the total 
returns on the PSI-20 Index, latter used as the market’s return benchmark. 
4.2 Methodology 
 4.2.1 Return 








Rp        (1) 
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Rm       (2) 
The logarithmic mean is displayed to obtain the mean monthly returns of the schemes used 
throughout this chapter. 
 4.2.2 Benchmark 
To perform a comparative analysis between PRSF and an alternative benchmark with 
common characteristics, new data was collected with regard to two other classes of assets 
(besides the already selected PSI-20 Index). Notably, T-Bonds rates and Euribor interests rates 
over a three months period on long-run deposits, all gathered from Bank of Portugal online 
database. This benchmark76 was built in accordance with the Portfolio Theory and with the 
ceiling limits imposed to PRSF portfolio strategy. Notably, a portfolio composed in 50% by T-
Bonds, 30% long-run deposits and 20% stocks over the PSI-20 Index. Hence, the benchmark’s 
return is computed using the return rates of each considered assets, that is: 
tPSItDepositstTBondstBenchmark RRRR ,20,,, *2,0*3,0*5,0 ++=     (3) 
with, 
tTBondsR ,  as the return rate on T-Bonds for a t period 
tDepositsR , as the return rate on deposits with an Euribor over a three months period for a t 
period  
tPSIR ,20  as the return rate on PSI-20 Index for a t period 
 4.2.3 Risk free asset 
Another interesting concept to retain is the risk free asset, theoretically identified as 
having zero variability of returns. Such type of asset is mostly used to determine the excess of 
returns or the premiums obtained by an individual that has assumed the risk of investing in a 
                                                 
76 Most fund managers’ use as benchmark a combination of several other assets, including real state, and 
foreign mutual funds, besides the ones disclosed, but always in accordance with the prudential rules 
regarding the PRSF investment policy. 
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savings scheme. The current study uses Bank of Portugal database to select the risk-free rate, 





tRf =        (4) 
 4.2.4 Risk 
The return analysis is an important aspect of PRSF performance evaluation. However, it 
is insufficient to measure PRSF risk exposition and their response to market fluctuations. 
Modern investment analysis points out two risk measures and a further diversification measure:  
1. total (or unsystematic)  risk, measured through the standard deviation; 
2. market (or systematic) risk, measured through the beta of each scheme; 
3. diversification measure through the coefficient of determination. 
1. The total (or unsystematic) risk, measured through the standard deviation 
This is a unique risk which is specific to a particular scheme and is unrelated to the overall 
market variability. It is commonly associated to investment and liquidity risks. To measure this 















iσ        (5) 
The standard deviation was computed using the logarithmic monthly means on PRSF. 
2. The market (or systematic) risk, measured through the β of each scheme 
This risk is directly linked with the overall market variability and it corresponds to the part of 
the total risk that is non diversifiable. It is commonly associated to interest rate risk, market and 
inflation risks. Since these market events occur regardless of investors’ portfolio decisions, they 
tend to be difficult to eliminate. To measure the systematic risk it is applied the Sharpe’s Market 
Model (1963). The Market model is valid if it satisfies two key assumptions: 
1. All assets are related with each other throughout the market’s portfolio; 
2. There is a linear relationship between the assets and the market’s portfolio. 
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For each scheme, the mathematical form is represented by: 
  ptmptp RR εβα ++= ,, *       (6) 
with, 
tpR ,  as the return on the PRSF for a t period 
tmR ,  as the market return, here represented by PSI20 Index for a t period 
pβ  as the slope of the linear regression 
pε  as the error term 
The constants α and β will be different from scheme to scheme and shall be computed using 
equation 6 and regressing monthly market returns with monthly PRSF returns. The β coefficient 
measures the vulnerability of the portfolio returns against the markets’ returns. High values77 of 
β indicate that PRSF returns are highly sensitive to market returns. By contrast, lower values of 
β indicate low sensitivity. The error term78 ( pε ) is assumed as an approximation to the 
portfolio’s total risk and thus, diversifiable.  
3. Diversification measure through the coefficient of determination 
Portfolio’s diversification is important since it allows the improvement of PRSF 
performance. It can be measured using the coefficient of determination (that is, the value of 2R ) 
provided by the Market model regression. Barnea and Logue (1973) argued that the coefficient 
of determination indicates fund’s extent for diversification. The higher the 2R , the closer a 
portfolios return is to the market’s returns. By contrast, a lower 2R  represents portfolio’s large 
potential for diversification. However, the authors’ conclusions for a single security case (where 
the 2R  indicates the market’s diversification estimate within a managing entity) were 
                                                 
77 Note that, lower values of β are desirable during a bear phase that is a short or even long period during 
which the price of the scheme is remarkably low. A higher value of β is desirable during a bull phase that 
is a short or even long period during which the price of the scheme is remarkably high. This approach is 
used for the stock market but it may me used for savings schemes. 
78 The Market Model assumes that the error term follows a normal distribution with mean equal to zero 
and variance equal to a constant. 
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inconclusive. Consequently, the analyses on 2R  shall be taken merely as an indicative measure 
of diversification.  
 
4.3 Methodological limitations  
The present study has the following limitations: 
1.PRSF used in the study suffered from the problem of missing values, therefore it was 
applied a mobile average over 21 days that displayed a trend line which smoothes the 
recurrences of the days and grants a more appropriate overview of the period trend. 
2. Pension plan sponsors tend to offer different types of PRSF contracts so that 
individuals may self-select the type of contract corresponding to their profile. The 
schemes under study are classified as having low risk (level 1 in a 6 scale) which limits 
the probability of obtaining higher performances.  
3. The study only considers schemes with the same goals, risk profile (low) and similar 
investment constraints, which may generate misleading results79. 
4. Many academics favour T-Bonds estimates as risk free asset. However, the present 
study uses, as risk-free asset, the MRR which happens to be in accordance with the PII 
Report on the Insurance Sector and Pension Funds (2006), a reference within pension 
funds and insurance market.  
5. The analysis is also constrained to non-identical time periods and non-equal sample 
of observations. 
6. The examined data excludes the effects of subscription and withdrawal commissions 
on portfolio’s returns, since PRSF performance evaluation is frequently observed in the 
perspective of pension plan sponsors. However, the current study did not neglect 
individual’s perspective as it includes a brief survey on the commissions charged by 
each sponsor at the time of subscription and withdrawal.  
                                                 
79 This fact may result in sample’s selection bias. 
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7. The study only covers the schemes that are currently tradable. Thus, it ignores the 
funds that have been liquidated or absorbed by other funds. This may bias our sample 
results. 
 
4.4 Revisiting portfolio performance measures 
4.4.1 The CAP-model 
In 1952, Markowitz introduced the concept of portfolio theory. He was the first to build 
up a measure of portfolio risk and to obtain the expected return and risk of a specific portfolio. 
Later on, Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) carried out predictions for portfolio’s 
expected returns on risky assets. Their contribution to portfolio theory was recognized with the 
development of the Capital Asset Pricing model (CAP-model80) which relates a portfolio’s 
expected return to a systematic risk measure. The CAP-model equation81 is computed as: 
[ ] [ ]( )tftmptftp RRERRE ,,,, −+= β      (7) 
 with,  
 [ ]tpRE ,  as the portfolio’s expected return for a t period  
 tfR ,  as the risk-free return for a t period 
 pβ    as the systematic risk of the portfolio 
 [ ]tmRE ,  as the expected market’s portfolio return  
This mathematical form expresses a portfolio’s expected return as a function of a risk free asset 
(compensating investors for favouring savings instead of consumption) and a further systematic 
risk times a risk premium (compensating investor for assuming the investment risk). 
                                                 
80 The model holds true within a special set of hypotheses, namely: 1) investor’s goal is to maximize the 
expected utility over each period of wealth; 2) investors base their decisions  taking into account the asset 
returns and their variance; 3) investors are risk averse individuals; 4) Investors have homogenous 
expectations about asset returns and variance and they all have the same time horizon; 5) there are no 
market imperfections such as taxes, transaction costs or restrictions on short selling and information is 
costless and available to all investors; 6) all assets are perfectly divisible; 7) there is a risk free asset 
similar to all investors that can be used in order to borrow or lend capital amounts;  8) the capital market 
is at the equilibrium. 
81 Also called as the Security Market Line  (SML). 
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Since this is an ex-ante analysis and the market panorama may not be clear, the CAP-model is 
frequently postulated using an ex-post version that rewrites the earlier equation as the following: 
 ttftmptftpttftmptftp RRRRRRRR εβεβ +−=−⇒+−+= )()( ,,,,,,,,  (8) 
 with, 
tε as the residuals on portfolio returns, which hold on an expected mean equal to zero 
[E( tε )=0], a constant variance [V( tε )=c] and is non-correlated with the market’s return 
Corr( tε , tmR , )=0. 
Also, the market may not be at the equilibrium and without the efficiency of the market 
portfolio the CAP-model is non-testable. Hence, it is important not to constraint the regression 
to pass through the origin, meaning that the regression may be computed as: 
ttftmpptftp RRRR εβα +−+=− )( ,,,,     (9) 
           Systematic Risk  Total Risk 
with,  
pα  as security’s risk adjusted performance
82  
This regression is derived from the Jensen model (1969), which states that portfolio’s excess of 
returns relatively to a risk-free rate depends merely on the pβ  systematic risk. The Jensen 
measure finds out whether a scheme manager outperformed a market return. If pα is positive 
than the portfolio’s expected return registers a positive risk adjusted performance.  
 4.4.2 The Treynor ratio 
 The Treynor ratio (1965)83 is defined as the risk premium, or the excess return (over the 
risk-free rate), per unit of systematic risk (where the risk is measured by a portfolio beta derived 
from the Security Market Line (SML)). This index is computed as: 
                                                 
82 Also called as the Jensen measure. 
83 Also identified as “reward to volatility ratio “by Sharpe, Alexander e Bailey (1995). 










=        (10) 
with,  
tpT , as the Treynor ratio for a security portfolio, while the other variables have been 
already identified  
Treynor’s index for a security portfolio is analysed in opposition to a market index. Because the 
market’s beta is equal to one ( 1=mβ ), than: 
tftmtm RRT ,,, −=        (11a) 
with,  
mT as the Treynor Index for a market portfolio 
If tptm TT ,, < ( tptm TT ,, > ), than the scheme lies above (bellow) the SML, indicating a superior 
(or poor) performance relatively to the market index. 
4.4.3 The Sharpe ratio 
The Sharpe ratio (1966)84  is defined as the risk premium, or the excess return (over the 
risk-free rate), per unit of total risk (where the risk is measured by the standard deviation of 










=        (12) 
 with,  
tpS , as the Sharpe ratio for a security portfolio, while the other variables have been 
already identified  
As in the Treynor’s index, the Sharpe index for a security portfolio is analysed in opposition to 
a market index. The tmS ,  for a market portfolio is represented by: 
                                                 
84 Also identified by the author as “reward to variability ratio”. 
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), than the scheme earns more (less) than the excess return 
over the risk-free rate required by the CML and thus, indicating a superior (poor) performance 
relatively to the market index. 
4.4.4 The Sharpe measure 
From Sharpe’s Market Model (1963) derived in equation 6, it is possible to quantify the 
level of systematic and unsystematic risks associated to a security as: 
Systematic risk= 2 ,
2
tRm
σβ   from the explained variance (13) 




σ as the variance of portfolio’s returns  
2
,tmR
σ  as the variance of market’s returns 
β  as the Beta coefficient obtained from Sharpe’s Market Model  
A portfolio is assumed to be well diversified if it is expected to exhibit a low unsystematic risk 
level.  
4.4.5 The Jensen measure 
 In contrast with the Treynor and Sharpe ratios, the Jensen measure is defined in terms of 
portfolio’s excess of return (over the risk-free rate) over the CAP-model expected returns, 
setting up a premium for the systematic risk. In other words, Jensen’s measure for a security 
portfolio corresponds to the relationship between a portfolio’s return and its’ expected return, if 
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the portfolio had laid on the SML, taking into account a similar systematic risk. This may be 
quantified as: 
( )[ ] )()( ,,,,,,,,, tftmptftptftmptftptp RRRRRRRRJ −−−=−+−= ββ  (15) 
with,  
tpJ , as the Jensen measure for a scheme portfolio, while the other variables have been 
already identified  
If tpJ , is positive (negative) than the scheme earned more (less) than the expected returns and 
lies above (bellow) the SML, indicating a superior (poor) performance of the portfolio security.  
4.4.6 The Fama measure 
The Fama measure is defined in terms of portfolio’s excess of return (over the risk-free 
rate) over the CML expected returns, setting up a premium for the unsystematic risk. Notably, 
Fama’s measure for a security portfolio corresponds to the relationship between a portfolio’s 
return and its’ expected return, if the portfolio had laid on the CML. Fama’s performance 







tftptp RRRRF −−−= σ
σ
    (16) 
with,  
tpF , as the Fama measure for a scheme portfolio, while the other variables have been 
already identified.  
If tpF , is positive (negative) than the scheme earned more (less) than the expected returns and 
lies above (bellow) the CML, indicating a superior (poor) performance of the portfolio security. 
 
4.5 Performance and market timing 
 On the issue of portfolio’s performance measures, some studies have attempted to 
identify the determinants behind a security return and risk. A consensual conclusion of many of 
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these studies is that a large portion of the variability obtained in a portfolio’s return is due to 
asset allocation or, in other words, to the decision to invest in asset classes. Brinson, Hood and 
Beebower (1986, 1991) results,86 supported these findings and attributed little responsibility to 
security selection and market timing. Security selection87 is referred to the ability of investment 
managers to select financial assets with superior returns through actively purchasing 
undervalued assets classes and under weighting overvalued asset classes. Market timing88 is 
referred to the ability of investment managers to strategically alter the asset allocation within a 
security in anticipation to market’s movements, thereby adjusting portfolio’s return to its 
systematic risk.  
4.5.1 The Mazuy-Treynor model 
In order to test market’s timing ability, Treynor and Mazuy (1966) added a square term 
to the CAP-model. The authors argued that if investment managers are able to anticipate 
fluctuations in price and income received, than they may increase (decrease) portfolio’s risk by 
the time they expect a rise (decline) in the price of financial assets. Hence, portfolio’s excess 
return is a non linear function of markets excess of returns computed as: 
2
,,,,,, )()( tftmptftmpptftp RRRRRR −+−+=− γβα   (17) 
 with, 
pγ as the market timing measure for a scheme portfolio, while the other variables have 
been already identified. 
                                                 
86 Brinson, Hood e Beebower (1986) study, found that 93,6% of the variability (in a sample made of 91 
pension fund over a 1974-83 period ) was attributed to investment policy and 5% to security selection. 
The latter study confirmed the earlier findings as 91,5% of the variations (in sample made of 82 pension 
plans over a 1977-87 period) were due to asset allocation. 
87 For Fama (1972), a portfolio’s excess returns may be the result of the earnings derived from selectivity 
and market timing, keeping in mind that selectivity is divided into two categories: net selectivity and 
diversification. Net selectivity measures the ability of investment managers in obtaining a fair value for 
the portfolio’s systematic risk and at the same time extending diversification to unsystematic risk, while 
diversification measures the degree to which a portfolio may be perfectly diversified. 
88 The timing ability ( )γ  and selection ability(α ) are two different concepts. A scheme’s portfolio is 
able to out perform the market just by moving to higher and lower risk portfolio when needed, without the 
necessary recognition of the schemes with better risk-adjusted returns. 
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If pγ is positive (negative) than it indicates that investment managers were able (not able) to 
anticipate fluctuations in price and income received by the security. 
 
4.6 Results and analysis 
 4.6.1 Absolute performance of PRSF with and without commissions 
 A look at 11 reveals the absolute performance of PRSF, excluding commissions 
applied by each management company. 
Table 11: Annual average returns- without commissions on PRSF and E/RSF 
 
Source: Author’s estimates   
 
In general, all scheme’s gross89 returns were positive during the period 2003-2007, 
excluding Vanguarda PPR and Caixa Reforma Valor. These two schemes tend to add high risk 
asset classes (almost 30% in stocks from domestic, European and international markets) and 
investments (real state property, derivatives) to their portfolio. Thus, tend to vary more widely, 
in time and in magnitude, then their counterparts. Since 2003, the MultiReforma, the PPR 
Vintage and the PPR Platinium funds can be rated as the best performers. In 2007, most 
                                                 
89 These are gross returns since they exclude the commissions on withdrawal and on subscription. The 
mathematical formula on a scheme return is only liquid from taxes and commissions on deposit and 
management.  
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schemes earned less than in previous years. This significant slowdown in PRSF performance 
was in line with the latest trends90 on the economic climate indicator and the consumer’s 
confidence indicator. All open-ended schemes under performed the market returns (PSI20TR) 
over the period of 2003-07, with:  
• 2 schemes giving returns of less than 2% during 2003-04, 6 schemes in 2005, 3  
schemes in 2006 and 8 schemes giving returns of less than 2% in 2007; 
• 10 schemes giving returns of 2,1%-5% in 2003, 14 schemes in 2004, 6 schemes in 
2005, 13 schemes in 2006 and 11 schemes giving returns of 2,1%-5% in 2007; 
• 4 schemes giving returns of 5,1%-8,4% in 2003, 5 schemes in 2005, 4  schemes in 
2006 and one scheme giving returns of 5,1%-8,4% in 2007; 
• 2 schemes with returns of 8,5% and above in 2005. 
A scheme’s superior performance may not result in high earnings (for individuals) if it 
ignores the effects of commission’s on its final return. The later estimates are expressed in 
nominal terms91, thus not capturing in detail a scheme’s effective return. 
The study focuses on the commissions charged at the entry and withdrawal levels. The 
subscription commission reimburses investment managers for the scheme issuing costs, while 
the withdrawal commission aims to slowdown the volatility associated to inflows and outflows 
in PRSF deposits92.  
A look at Table 12 reveals the quantitative information on the commissions charged by 
each managing entity. The data suggests that PRSF are more penalized via withdrawal 
commission than via subscription commission as many pension plans sponsors prefer to cut in 
the commission charged at the entry level than at the withdrawal commission. This is so 
because PRSF are saving schemes that are consistent with a long-run time horizon drawn to 
                                                 
90 Over the last years, the Portuguese economy has been affected by a continuous decline in private 
savings and a boost in household’s domestic debt, phenomenon’s that happen to be prior to the under 
study period (2003-07) but have intensified during the past two years.   
91 These are the values disclosed by investment managers to capture individual’s interests. 
92Despite the restrict circumstances that allow individuals to withdrawal. Note that withdrawal 
commissions will decrease in line with the increase of the scheme’s stability. Furthermore, this type of 
commission will vary according to the period of withdrawal and to fund’s nature. 
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close pension gaps. As a result, individuals are expected to accumulate a financial wealth that is 
lock until retirement or any other circumstance provided by law.  
Table 12: Main commissions applied on PRSF and E/RSF 
 
Source: On-line prospects  
 
As observed, excluding this type of information from individuals may envisage their 
preferences towards schemes that performed well but imply aggressive commissions. Hence, the 
net effect on wealth may not remain unaffected. Comparing these values with the gross returns 
computed for each scheme, it is clear that there may be other schemes performing better for an 
acceptable price. This is the case of Viva, PPR/E 5 Estrelas, PPR/E Europa and Caixa Reforma 
Valor93. However, for MultiReforma and PPR/Platinium the welfare gains remain significant. 
4.6.2 Relative performance of PRSF 
In order to delineate a superior investment strategy, pension plans sponsors should 
compare it with an alternative portfolio (a benchmark) with common characteristics (Table 13).  
Table 13: Return on a benchmark 
 
Source: Author’s estimates   
 
                                                 
93 Note that Caixa Reforma Valor returns varies significantly. 
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By simulating an alternative portfolio, this study attempts to assess the impact of 
passive (benchmark) and active asset allocations on 20 personal retirement savings funds during 
the period of 2003-07. Table 14 uses as a return measure the excess returns (over a benchmark 
return). 
Table 14: Excess return of PRSF and E/RSF without commissions 
 
Source: Author’s estimates   
 
The results show that, since 2003, the welfare gains of purchasing an alternative portfolio can be 
extensive just by changing the asset allocation of a fund. However, it is less likely that the 
benchmark will out perform the market index. In fact, the PSI-20TR index is not only capable 
of out performing the 20 schemes but it may even achieve higher returns than the ones earned 
by the benchmark.  
Under a year-to-year basis, the analysis may present some revealing facts. In 2003, out 
of 20 open-ended schemes, 4 funds out performed the benchmark. And in 2005, 7 schemes 
recorded returns higher than benchmark return’s. In all other years, none out performed the 
benchmark. Meaning that investment managers are required to review their asset allocation 
policy over time since a static asset allocation is not consistent with on-going market 
fluctuations.  
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4.6.3 Absolute and relative performance per managing entity 
As for pension plans sponsors, the data on gross returns varies widely from scheme to 
scheme, allowing individuals to self-select the type of contract that suits their interests (given 
the return performance and the level of commissions charged). ESAF-FP and Futuro are the 
managing entities offering higher returns. However, Futuro charges fewer commissions than 
ESAF-FP. When considering the average estimates on the excess returns (over a benchmark 
return), computed each year and per pension plans sponsors, the results are more homogeneous 
since they all present negative excess returns, excluding ESAF-FP that in 2003 out performed in 
1,3553% the benchmark and in 2005, out performed in 0,9273%. 
4.6.4 Risk-return analysis 
 A study based only in a return performance measure is inconclusive since a portfolio’s 
return is associated to a particular level of risk. Since the key objective of the asset allocation 
policy is for a scheme to achieve higher earnings for a tolerable risk level or, in alternative, a 
lower risk for a required rate of return, it is convenient to study the binomial risk-return relation 
for each PRSF. For each scheme, it is studied the risk-return analysis over the period 2003-07. 
Table 15: Statistical properties on PRSF and E/RSF 
 
Source: Author’s estimates   
 
 - 73 - 
Table 15 summarizes the statistical properties on the 20 schemes under study and on the 
market index measured through PSI20TR. The first four columns record the scheme’s average 
and median returns, the maximum and minimum returns achieved by each scheme and the 
variations in returns.  
As expected, all open-ended schemes under performed the market returns (Annex 3). 
Furthermore, all funds registered a lower total risk level comparing with market’s volatility. 
This fact is not surprising. A large proportion of PRSF asset allocation is concentrated in low 
risky asset classes (i.e. Bonds, cash …) in order to cover potential liquidity constraints on the 
certificate units, while the market’s portfolio’s is composed merely of stocks, which add more 
risk since it fluctuates in value more.  
Table 16 dPIIlays a 2x2 matrix based in a BCG matrix. The goal is to link investment 
strategies to a risk-return analysis, allowing individuals to compare schemes at a glance 
Table 16: Risk-return diagram 
   
Source: Author’s approach and figure collected from NetMBA.com/ 
 
. As observed, all schemes are positioned at the dog region since their returns 
underperformed the market returns and, at the same time, presented lower total risk levels. 
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Meaning that personal retirement savings funds do not require substantial investment amounts, 
nor generate a significant quantity of financial wealth for retirement. As a result, the investment 
in PRSF may be locking savings that could be better applied elsewhere (i.e. banking deposits, 
retirement certificates (expected to earn 5% rate each year)). Unless pension plans sponsors 
offer better contracts that happen to be capital guaranteed, such type of schemes should be 
liquidated if individuals’ welfare gains have little prospects to increase. 
Modern portfolio theory assumes that a schemes return follows a normal distribution 
totally defined by its first two moments: the mean and the variance. However, table 15 shows 
that half of the schemes distribution would be better described by introducing the 3rd and 4th 
order moments to the conventionally-employed first two. The 3rd moment (skewness)94 is 
computed in column 6th as a measure on the asymmetry distribution of the returns. The 4th 
moment (kurtosis) 95 is estimated in column 7th as a measure on the extent to which outliers (that 
is, very high and very low returns) occur more frequently (high kurtosis) or less frequently (low 
kurtosis) relative to a normal distribution. The location (skewness) and extent of variability 
(kurtosis) on a scheme return distribution will depend on investment manager’s objectives, 
constraints and time horizon (and this will tend to vary from scheme to scheme).  
A JB test (Jarque-Bera Test)96 is computed (in column 8th) using the absolute value of 
both skewness and kurtosis. For half of PRSF, the p-value is below the 5% default significance 
                                                 
94 A scheme’s returns exhibits positive skewness if it is skewed to the right of the mean and it exhibits 
negative skewness if it is skewed to the left of the mean. Note that, investors will be often willing to 
accept low or even negative returns if the schemes exhibit positive skewness, since this implies that a 
scheme return is skewed to the right of the mean, therefore granting higher expected returns. Only PPR 
Vintage, Praemium S, Futuro Clássico and BBVA Solidez PPR registered positive skewness. 
95 High kurtoses (also called fat tails) indicate a large fraction of very high and very low returns than it 
would be expected under a normal distribution. Low kurtoses (also called thin tails) indicate a small 
fraction of very high and very low returns than it would be expected under a normal distribution. Note 
that, investors will prefer low to negative excess of kurtosis (that is, a value under 3), since this would 
imply better expected returns. Out of 20 schemes, 15 registered low excess of kurtosis. 
96 See Jarque, C.M. and Bera (1987), A.K., on “A Test for Normality of Observations and Regression 
Residuals”, International Statistical Review, vol.55, pp.163-172. The JB Test is computed as: 
. For large sample sizes, the test statistic has a chi-square distribution with two 
degrees of freedom. 



























































































































level and so the test rejects the null hypothesis that the distribution is normal. This fact is 
corroborated when observing the return distribution on the 20 schemes (Figure 12). 









































































































































































































Source: Author’s estimates 
   
Under a non normality distribution assumption, efficient frontier models (drawn from 
CAP-model) may underestimate97 the true risk level involved in a scheme as they exclusively 
rely on risk-return analysis98 (that is, on the first two moments of the return distributions) to 
evaluate schemes performance measures. Also, it is important to determine the stationarity of 
returns for each fund. Table 15 (last column) shows the results of the ADF test (Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller Test.). The test reveals that all schemes are stationary in levels, when considered 
with a trend, at a 5% significance level. This implies that, at each period, returns are derived 
from the same distribution.  
4.6.4.1 The CAP model  
It should be stressed that the core of this study is not to test the validity of CAP-model 
on each underlying assumption, but simply to assess performance measures on 20 PRSF. 
                                                 
97 This fact will have tremendous impact on the Sharpe and Treynor measures since these are measures 
that rely entirely in mean-variance analysis.  
98 Record that in a risk-return analysis, diversification is achieved with a lower standard deviation level, 
while under a non normal distribution sample, a portfolio is diversified if it increases skewness and 
decreases kurtosis. 
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Nevertheless, the results are carried out using an ex-post version of the CAP-model (equation 9) 
as to insure more predictable returns and approximate returns variations to the true risk level.  
A look at table 17 shows that each PRSF has given risk-adjusted returns lower than the 
market returns (that is, pα <0). This suggests that investment managers do not have the security 
selection skills to build up a risk-adjusted portfolio capable of out performing market’s index. 
When considering alpha’s significance value (from OLS regression), all 20 schemes registered 
an alpha value statistically different from zero. With regard to the beta parameter all schemes 
incurred in a lower systematic risk relatively to the market index. This is due to the fact that a 
large fraction of portfolio’s composition is concentrated in low risk asset classes. For each beta, 
the t-value is significant at a 5% significance level. 
Table 17: The CAPM model on PRS and E/RS funds 
 
Source: Author’s estimates   
Note 1: Market’s alpha is 0 under the equation 15; 
Note 2: For most schemes, it was detected autocorrelation in the residuals as well as heteroscedasticity, 
which require a New-West correction. The exception goes for the BBVA2015 and Vanguarda PPR 
schemes’ that only exhibited heteroscedasticity, thus demanding a White test. 
 
4.6.3.2 The Mazuy- Treynor model 
A look at table 18 reveals that most investment managers are able to foresee short-run 
market deviations and to adjust scheme’s portfolio accordingly ( 0>γ ). As for Vanguarda 
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PPR, Praemium S and BBVA Solidez PPR schemes, all three presented negative market 
timing99. The gamma coefficient indicates that all schemes do not compute market timing 
significantly different from zero. All PRSF registered an pα <0, indicating that investment 
managers have no selection ability to identify schemes performing higher risk-adjusted returns. 
As for the beta parameter, all schemes were exposed to lower systematic risk relatively to the 
market index. Each alpha and beta values are significant at a 5% significance level.  
Table 18: The Treynor and Mazuy model on PRS and E/RS funds 100  
 
Source: Author’s estimates  
 
4.6.3.3 The Treynor ratio, Sharpe Ratio and Sharpe measure 
Table 19 shows that all schemes101 present negative Sharpe and Treynor ratios. There are two 
reasons why the Treynor ratio may be negative: 
• fund's excess return over a risk-free rate is negative and the fund’s beta is 
positive 
                                                 
99 Such difficulty in immediately reallocating the funds to market fluctuations may be due to the nature 
and time horizon of asset classes. 
100 This measure of market timing may bias the results obtained  (e.g Grinblatt and Titman, 1989) since 
there may be funds recording a negative market timing simply because they are more exposed to time 
variation in market risk and to market risk premium (Ferson and Schadt (1996).  
101 Record that the sample’s distribution is, in same cases, non normal and consequently, the estimates 
obtained are seen as approximations to the true risk values. 
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• fund's excess return over a risk-free rate is positive and the fund’s beta is 
negative 
Since the estimates, computed on table 15, yield a positive value for all 20 schemes, fund’s 
negative Treynor ratio is attributable to portfolio’s poor performance, which happens to be well 
suited to fund’s systematic risk but unmatched to the returns on the risk-free asset. The same 
conclusion applies to the Sharpe ratio, since portfolio volatility has to be non-negative and 
therefore a negative Sharpe ratio could be only achieved if fund's excess return over a risk-free 
rate is negative. 
Table 19: The Treynor and Sharpe ratios and the Sharpe measure 
 
Source: Author’s estimates   
 
As a result, investment managers could have achieved better investment performance by, 
simply, holding risk-free assets instead of open-ended schemes. This suggests that participants 
could have invested in a risk-free asset (with a superior return) without incurring in the 
administrative cost of a privately managed retirement saving fund.  
Comparing the Treynor ratio for a portfolio return with the Treynor ratio for a market 
index ( tftmtm RRT ,,, −= = -0,0098), it turns out that all schemes under performed the market 
index since tptm TT ,, > . Applying the same procedure to the Sharpe ratio reveals that 










 and thus indicating a poor performance relatively to the market index ( tmS , = -
0,3256). 
Taking a glance at the Sharpe measure result’s in table 19 suggest that the average 
unsystematic risk is very high102 ( 0009,02 =σ , %04,3=σ ) with a modest degree of 
diversification at 19,52%. Meaning that, investment managers have a high scope to improve 
diversification as well as fund’s performance. 
4.6.3.4 The Jensen an Fama measures 
Table 20 shows that all sample funds registered negative Jensen and Fama measures. 
This is due to portfolio’s poor performance, which is corrected from the systematic risk but does 
not cover the returns on the risk-free asset nor on the market index. In fact, investment managers 
are likely to achieve superior investment performances through actively purchasing risk-free 
assets (such as cash, deposits and T-bonds) or more risky assets (such as stocks, hedge funds, 
etc) instead of PRSF. The same conclusion applies to Fama’s measure results. 
Table 20: Jensen and Fama measures 
 
Source: Author’s estimates 
 
                                                 
102 The average unsystematic risk is very high and is approximately the same amount of the market risk 
level. See Table 15 for a risk comparison.  
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The results imply that schemes returns were determined by security selection. The 
negative values for tpF ,  and tpJ ,  indicate that investment managers are in the position to 
identify their inaccuracy as funds earned less than expected returns and lie below the CML line 
and SML line, respectively. If investment managers do not correct their actions, the welfare 
gains of purchasing a PRSF are little and thus participants could be better off by investing in 
those assets on their own.  
4.6.3.5 Correlation between portfolio performance measures  
A balance between Sharpe and Treynor ratio’s allows fund’s managers to adjust their 
investment policy to a risk structure, while a balance between Jensen and Fama measures will 
give them the ability to select funds with superior returns. Next, it is examined the schemes 
ranks for each performance measure presented above. This study is done through the commonly 
used Spearmen coefficient (Table 21). The results suggest that there is a positive and highly 
significance correlation between Fama and Jensen measures and between Sharpe and Treynor 
ratios, although with some differences in magnitude. However, for a completely diversified, 
Sharpe and Treynor ratios should give identical ranks, thereby the differences between the two 
ratios derived directly from differences in diversification and from risk metrics.  
Table 21: Rank correlations of performance measures 
 
Source: Author’s estimates   
 
4.7 Problems with portfolio performance measures 
 Investment managers typically attempt to provide PRSF participants with superior 
returns. However, the experience shows that achieving higher returns must not be the primary 
goal of performance measures as this may be only due to:  
1) investment manager’s ability to generate better returns,  
2) to luck, or  
 - 83 - 
3) to the investment in risky assets whose net effect is likely to increase portfolio’s 
return for an acceptable risk level.  
Consequently, negative movements on the earlier conditions will immediately affect 
scheme’s investment strategy as well as performance measures contribution. Hence, 
performance measures may not be suitable in every circumstance. The recent sub-prime crises 
has aware investment managers on the need to frequently reprice financial assets as they may 
appear to vary less than they really do. Every time investment managers ignore this fact, 
participants are more exposed to higher variations in returns, which may lead to significant 
divergences in the estimates computed by the performance measures. 
Also, because performance measures are drawn to follow the normal distribution 
assumption, the results on returns may be bias. In this study, half of the sample exhibit 
asymmetrical returns. For a risk-averse investment manager, the presence of negative skewness 
(with 16 schemes) and positive excess kurtosis (5 schemes) are unappealing as they may 
indicate a higher probability of large losses than in the case of normally distributed returns103. 
Meaning that, the Sharpe ratio may fail to estimate the true level of risk as it focus merely in a 
mean-variance analysis, without accounting for non symmetrical-return distributions. Another 
crucial problem with these measures is autocorrelation. Evidences from the Durbin-Watson 
correlation test proved that almost all schemes were correlated with itself over the under studied 
period and this may lead to an underestimation of the standard deviation of returns. 
Consequently, once more the Sharpe ratio is likely to be overestimated.  
Many researchers have criticized Sharpe ratio's reliance on the unsystematic risk as a 
measure of risk. According to the academic community, this fact may bias the estimated results 
as it accounts upside volatility and downside volatility in the same way. In order to discriminate 
these two types of volatilities, it was developed in 1994 the Sortino ratio.  
                                                 
103 The skewness in the data may be due to the fact that some funds simply don’t voluntarily report their 
returns giving rise to selection bias. Moreover, PRSF participants face some difficulties in identifying 
their schemes performance since pension plans sponsors publish their reports in an anonymous way. 
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Moreover, portfolio’s estimates on alpha and beta depend on the use of a specific index 
as the benchmark of market’s portfolio. Because there isn’t an exact indicator to estimate 
market’s portfolio, investment managers use a proxy to the market index. Roll (1977, 1978) 
condemned any measure that attempted to estimate the market portfolio through a proxy index 
(in his case (S&P500) and in the case-study (PSI20TR)). The reasons may be summarized in 
two points: 1) difficulties in measuring a portfolio whose returns are repeated over time, and 2) 
small changes induced to the proxy variable may very well result in different ranks on the 
market return performance.  
In the same line, measuring risk free assets may lead investment managers to misleading 
results. Notably, T-bills give very low returns and thus allowing investment managers to earn 
higher returns by simply choosing a risk-free asset that earns a very low interest rate. Lehman 
and Modest (1987), studied performance measures vulnerability to changes induced to CAP and 
APT104 models. They concluded that shifts in a model structure generate different ranks on 
portfolio’s returns. And thus, investment measures performance depends on investment policy 












                                                 
104 Arbitrage pricing theory. 
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5. Conclusion 
This thesis assessed personal retirement savings plans performance, in Portugal. At first, 
the welfare gains of purchasing a PRSP upon retirement were expected to be significant, under 
the assumption that a scheme’s superior performance is achieved, mostly, through pension plan 
sponsors and investment managers privileged access to information and sophisticated 
techniques of performance evaluation rather than by a financially myopic individual. 
Nonetheless, the estimation results on the return, risk, security selection and market timing 
performance of a sample of 20 representative personal retirement savings funds, showed that: 
1. PRSF absolute performance was positive during the period 2003-2007 but insufficient to 
out perform the market index. When considering the amount of commissions applied at the 
entry and withdrawal level, scheme’s positive returns could be negligible for investment 
managers. This suggests that investment manager’s reports should be computed in net 
terms, providing a feasible and observable scheme return to plan’s participants; 
2. PRSF relative performance was not able to out perform a benchmark. In part, this is due to 
investment managers’ reluctance to follow Decree-Law Nr.158/2002 rules that stipulated 
the elimination of the minimum limits imposed to scheme’s asset allocation policy. One 
possible reason for such behaviour may be due to managers’ investment policy of 
purchasing illiquid and low return asset classes such as real estate. Another argument is that 
the investment in non-domestic shares constraints managers’ skills to adjust their asset 
allocation policy to international market movements as their access to private and public 
information on foreign markets is more restricted than under a domestic environment; 
3. PRSF risk-return analysis generated low returns and correspondent low risk levels. In 
addition, participants could have improved their future retirement income if their savings 
had been better applied elsewhere (i.e. banking deposits, retirement certificates (expected to 
earn 5% rate each year)); 
4. under the CAP-model, each PRSF has given lower risk-adjusted returns. This suggests that 
there is a financial margin for an improvement in fund’s efficiency. This improvement 
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could be achieved through the investment in other asset classes such as derivatives, 
allowing investment managers to build a short or a long position on an underlying asset 
(i.e.: shares) and, at the same time, providing an hedge on potential risks; 
5. under the Mazuy-Treynor model, investment manager’s selectivity skills remained 
significantly poor. Simultaneously, all schemes registered lower systematic risk levels 
relatively to the market index. This is in line with portfolio’s composition in low risk asset 
classes. Also, all schemes presented positive, but not significant, market timing skills, 
reflecting investment managers’ ability to foresee market movements and adjust scheme’s 
risk levels accordingly; 
6. in the context of Treynor and Sharpe ratios, schemes’ negative results indicated that 
participants could have accumulated a greater financial wealth upon retirement if they had 
hold risk-free assets instead of a PRSF. Hence, investment managers’ access to information 
and sophisticated techniques of performance evaluation are likely to have a residual impact 
on a fund’s performance if it ignores the need for an active asset allocation policy. 
Similarly, the Sharpe measure results pointed to a large scope for diversification and thus 
for the improvement of fund’s performance; 
7.  in the context of Jensen and Fama measures, PRSF negative values suggested that 
investment managers’ poor selectivity skills prevent them from identifying undervalued 
schemes.  
On balance, these results indicated that PRSF performance is compromised by managers’ poor 
asset allocation policy, timing and security selection skills. Future improvements in schemes 
performance will depend on: 
1. investment managers’ talent to correctly evaluate market movements and adjust asset 
classes within a fund;  
2. pension plan sponsors’ ability to minimize the level of PRSF commissions (particularly, the 
ones charged at the time of subscription) in order to provide a significant net return on 
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retirement savings funds and, at the same time, compete with social security retirement 
savings accounts; 
3. participant’s ability to: i) plan for retirement; ii) accumulate an adequate level of income 
upon retirement; iii) save in the long term and iv) invest in a PRSF when they are already 
enrolled in an occupational pension scheme. A look at PRSF performance results would 
induce lower participation rates over total and active population. However, the figures 
indicated that individual’s participation in these schemes continued to increase, motivated 
by the favourable tax treatment addressed to these savings schemes.   
4. State policies appear to favour PRSF tax relief rather than inducing a growing 
consciousness on the need to plan for retirement. This may bias individuals’ savings 
preferences as they may be joining these schemes for a tax deduction purpose and not for 
pension savings motives. Empirical researches were not conclusive on whether greater 
fiscal incentives could guarantee an increase in private savings. However, a criticism 
pointed out to retirement savings plans status quo is that the fiscal incentives associated to 
such schemes tend to discriminate lower-income households. Consequently, state social 
measures should start to focus on an effective three pillar model rather than the traditional 
Bismarkian pension regime and, in this way, distribute individual’s financial ability to save 
for retirement through each pension pillar. Such procedure is being followed by many 
European countries. 
5. academic community skills to develop new performance measures for investment managers 
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Annex 1: Summary on Legal and Regulatory framework regarding PRSP 
Year Legal Document  Statement  
1989 Decree-Law 
Nr.205/89  
Set up a system of personal retirement saving plans 
1989 Ministerial Order 
Nr.872-A/89 
Endorsement of the juridical regime regarding personal retirement 
saving plans (PRSP) 
1990 Decree-Law 
Nr.145/90 
Establishment of specific rules to the composition of the assets 
represented in a PRSP 
1991 Decree-Law 
Nr.415/91 
Adjustments introduced in the regime covering the constitution and 
management of pension funds 
1991 Rule Nr.298/91 PII classification of PRSP hold in the form of pension funds 
1995 Decree-Law 
Nr.204/95 
Set up the legal regime of the equity savings plans (Eq.SP) 
1999 Decree-Law 
Nr.357/99 
Establishment of  the educational savings plans (ESP) 
2002 Decree-Law 
Nr.158/2002 
Aggregated savings plans framework relating PRSP, ESP and E/ RSP 
2002 Ministerial Order 
Nr.1451/2002 
Determined that the net value of a saving fund may involve a brand 
of assets 
2002 Ministerial Order 
Nr.1452/2002 
Specified rules for withdrawals  carried out each year and subject to 
the annual limits 
2002 Ministerial Order 
Nr.1453/2002 
Announcement of the circumstances required to withdrawal     
2002 Law Nr.32/2002 Set up the legal framework of the Social Security System, the roles of 
the social security institutions and its articulation with private entities 
with analogous purposes 
2003 Regulation 
Nr.6/2003R 
Regulation of the conditions of reimbursement, transfers and 
discriminative publication of savings fund asset portfolio by PII 
2006 Decree-Law 
Nr.12/2006 
Introduced amendments referring to pension plans investment policy, 
evolution of the arrangement rights and, ultimately, financial 
standing of pension funds. 
2007 Law Nr.4/2007 Approved the Framework Law of the Social Security System 
2008 Decree-Law Nr. 
26/2008 
Set up the rules of a public complementary pension regime 
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Annex 2: Arguments supporting private and public PRSP 
 Private PRSP Retirement certificates (Public PRSP)  
Characteristics  Nominative certificates of a retirement 
saving fund, represented by 
participation units contained in the fund. 
Personal accounts, represented by 
participation units (“retirement certificates”) 
of a retirement certificate fund, managed by 
the Capitalization Fund Management 




Free: per month, per trimester,  per 
semester or per year  
One possibility: per month and stable during 
a minimum period of 12 months 
Exceptional 
deliveries 
Free: Whenever individuals feel free, so 
long they deliver to the manager the  
minimums imposed (from 1€, 
depending on rules of PRSP 
subscription) 
 
Absent: Retirement certificates don’t specify 
the possibility of exceptional deliveries 
Amount of 
Investment  
Free: Individuals are free to choose the 
amount they wish to invest, so long they 
deliver to the manager the  minimums 
imposed (from 1€, depending on rules 
of PRSP subscription) 
Constrained to: 
• 2 to 6% of the monthly average salary or  
• 2 to 4% of the monthly average salary or 
• up until  6% of the monthly average 




Free: a number of choices are available 
to individuals depending on their 
preferences and profiles such as: 
guaranteed rate, guaranteed capital, 
conservative investors, prudent 
investors, capital concentrated in stocks 
(up until 55% of PRSP portfolio 
invested in stocks. 
 
One possibility: the retirement certificate is 
invested in a conservative fund, managed by 
the Capitalization Fund Management 




20% of the invested income: With an 
annual limit from 300€ to 400€ per 
person or from 600€ to 800€ per couple, 
depending on savers age. 
20% of the invested income: With an annual 
limit of 350€, no matter the age. However, 
individuals shall only reach the plafond so 
long as they earn a monthly income upper to 
3650€ (and a discount of 4%) or upper to 






good-wills   
Capital withdrawal: After 8 years of 
investment in PRSP plan, it is applied 
an 8% income personal tax (IPT) 
against good-wills obtained with PRSP 
deposits (excluding capital). Before this 
period, the IPT is 20%.  
Life income withdrawal: the IPT against 
life income (capital + good-wills) is 
15%. 
 
Capital withdrawal: Presently unknown. 
Life income withdrawal: the income personal 
tax against life income (capital + good-wills) 
is 15%. 
Eligibility  All Contributors: Merely individuals making 







Variable: From 0%, depending on PRSP 
and on the its managing policy. 
However, there are few PRSP 
exhibiting high commissions.  
<0,1% 
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Financial 
Penalty due to 
payment 
default  
None: There is no penalty in case of 
monthly payment default 
When the payment of a contribution is 
missing, participants incur in proceedings 
and administrative expenditures (0,50€ for 
each default). If the payment default persists 
during a period of 3 consecutive months or if 
there is an absence of capital in the personal 
account to cover default expenses, the 
obligation to contribute to public PRSP plans 
is suspended.   
Conditions to 
withdrawal  
Free: Individuals are free to withdraw 
their savings, partially or entirely, 
whenever they wish and according to 
the already inferred circumstances. 
However, they are constrained to 
penalties in case withdraw occurs before 
the 5 years PRSP contract. 
Constrained: Individuals may only withdraw 
their savings by the time they reach 
retirement or in case of permanent inability. 
 
 
Returns Guaranteed or non-guaranteed return 
rates: Many PRSP guarantee a return 
rate of 3% or more (this is mostly the 




Non-guaranteed return rate: The retirement 
certificate does not offer a guarantee rate. 
The income depends of the managing 
performance of the Capitalization Fund 
Management Institute of Social Security. In 
October 2007, the annualized benchmark 
return rate was roughly 5,5%. 
Risk Retirements saving funds depend on the 
categories of the Portfolio investment. 
Particularly, funds integrated in 
category A, that is, with a 0% to 5% 
exposition to stocks are classified as 
low risk (conservatives). The higher the 
risk they offer, the higher the return 
obtained.  
The public fund exhibits a conservative 
profile, of low risk, in line with the Financial 
Stabilization Fund of the Social Security, 
managed by the Capitalization Fund 
Management Institute of Social Security. 
Transfers Free: Whenever individuals feel like, 
they may transfer their retirement 
savings to an alternative PRSP with a 
different profile and different manager  
Absent: In the context of retirement 
certificates, savings are not allowed to 
transfer to other managers. Moreover, the 
amounts invested are managed by the 
Capitalization Fund Management Institute of 
Social Security until individual’s retirement. 
Suspension Free: Whenever individuals wish to 
close their PRSP. 
Constraint to: 
 1. participant intention by the time of 
renewal  
 2. participant claim due to permanent 
inability or sickness 
 3. unemployment 
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